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Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter
By LEAH CHAN GRINVALD*

Introduction

T

HE U.S. REPUTATION FOR LITIGIOUSNESS is so pervasive that it has
entered our cultural fabric: books and articles have been written about it and
a variety of popular media have satirized our infamy.1 There is a paradox,
though. Statistics show that approximately only three percent of all legal
disputes are brought to the judicial system.2 Of this three percent, only a
small fraction of disputes are litigated to a final decision.3 How can
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1. See, e.g., Seinfeld: The Maestro (NBC television broadcast Oct. 5, 1995) (satirizing Liebeck v.
McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994),
vacated, 1994 WL 16777704 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 1994)). In this episode of Seinfeld, one of the main
characters, Kramer, sues a local coffee shop for serving him coffee that was “too hot,” burning his
stomach (because he had attempted to sneak the coffee hidden in his waistband into a movie
theater). Id.
2. See William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some Preliminary
Results, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 761 (2004).
3. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 585, 589 (2008); Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV.
375, 377 (2014).
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Americans still be so litigious while simultaneously having fairly low per
capita rates of lawsuits?4 This Article suggests that the growing practice of
resolving disputes through the use of abusive cease-and-desist letters is the
answer to this paradox.5 Cease-and-desist letters are abusive when they
contain a threat (implicit or explicit) of litigation if the target does not comply
with the letter’s demands, as well as one or more of the following items:
unnecessary legalese (including unsubstantiated statutory citations), demands
for a settlement within a short time frame, demands for immediate payment
of some form of fees, and/or weak legal claims.6 Based on this growing trend
and the potential harms these letters bring, this Article proposes that when
abusive cease-and-desist letters are sent to vulnerable populations, such as
small businesses or individuals, a certain amount of policing is needed.
While there are no comprehensive statistics documenting how many
cease-and-desist letters are sent each year, there are strong indications of
increasing frequency at least in the intellectual property field.7 For example,
a recent qualitative empirical study evaluating experienced intellectual
property attorneys found that almost all of the interviewed attorneys handled
the majority of their clients’ disputes through cease-and-desist letters.8 These
4. See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem,
Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 456 (2004) (stating that current litigation rates in the United
States are not exceptionally high). The per capita rate of litigation in the United States is similar to
that of peer nations, such as England and Australia. Id.; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and
Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943,
198182 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Eriq Gardener, How to Write an Effectively Nasty Lawyer Letter, HOLLYWOOD REP.
(July 18, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/marty-singer-cease-and-desist-letter350612 (“In the cutthroat world of Hollywood law, the pen can be mightier than the sword. With
litigation costs skyrocketing and court dockets clogged, a forceful cease-and-desist letter is
increasingly a much quicker and more effective weapon than the sharp blade of litigation. But it is
not without risks.”).
6. See, e.g., Letter from Diane M. Reed, Attorney, Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP, to
Christopher J. Day, Law Office of Christopher Day (Sept. 4, 2009) (on file with author) (requiring
compliance with the listed demands within two weeks from date of letter); Letter from Nat’l Football
League to Ms. Thom, Fleurty Girl (Jan. 13, 2010) (on file with author) (requiring compliance with
the listed demands within nine days from date of letter).
7. See Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 85457 (2012) (discussing the rise in trademark bullying through the
sending of cease-and-desist letters); Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist
Letters, DMCA Notifications and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 50 IDEA 777, 784
(2010) (“[C]ease-and-desist letters are frequently utilized in disputes concerning intellectual
property and represent an important feature of the intellectual property law landscape.”).
8. William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 48182 (2012) (describing the phenomenon as
“demand letter lawyering”).
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same lawyers admitted that where such letters are sent to small businesses or
individuals, it was often more effective to be “abusive.”9 While the study
participants do not use the term “abusive,” the manner in which they enforce
rights against low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and individuals,
can be deemed abusive under this Article’s definition.10 In addition, these
lawyers also admitted that they tended to enforce claims through cease-anddesist letters, even where the lawyers believed the claims had little merit.11
Further, the fact that state government and legislative entities believe there is
a current need to address the issue of “patent trolls,”12 provides support for
this growing trend.13
Although there are a variety of influences spurring the increased use of
abusive cease-and-desist letters, four likely culprits are (1) the exorbitant cost
of litigation and its outcome uncertainty, (2) the lack of legal consequences
for sending such letters, and (3) the effectiveness of the letters. Litigation is
expensive, and therefore, it is in the intellectual property rights holders’ best
economic interest (even for multinational corporations with large legal
budgets) to try to and resolve disputes without resorting to litigation.14
Additionally, in certain areas of the law (in particular, in intellectual property
law), the outcome of litigation is not easily predicted due to the uncertainties

9. See id. at 478.
10. See id.; see also infra Part I.B (discussing four factors that create an abusive cease-and-desist
letter).
11. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 475, 481 (stating that one of the themes of the study was the
extent to which the participants enforced weak claims).
12. “Patent trolls” are typically defined as business entities that have obtained patent rights
for the sole purpose of obtaining licensing fees through coercion (such as threats of litigation). See
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, NAT’L ECON, COUNCIL & OFFICE OF SCI. &
TECH. POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND
INNOVATION 34 (2013) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT]. The specific problems related to
patent trolls have been extensively explored in academic literature and have also been highlighted
as an executive-level policy concern to the U.S. economy. See id. at 1213; James Bessen, Jennifer
Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls 2 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship
/workingpapers/documents/Bessen-Ford-Meurer-no-11-45rev.pdf (“We find that NPE lawsuits
are associated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010 . . . .”).
See also infra Part III.C.
13. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen. Office, A.G. Schneiderman Announces
Groundbreaking Settlement with Abusive “Patent Troll” (Jan. 14, 2014), http://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/ag-schneiderman-announces-groundbreaking-settlement-abusive-%E2%80%9Cpatenttroll%E2%80%9D [hereinafter N.Y. Press Release].
14. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 7, at 787 (citing Bruce Sewell, Intel’s General Counsel, who
estimates Intel’s costs for dealing with patent infringement claims are around three to five million
dollars per year).
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in the applicability of some doctrines and their corresponding defenses.15
Furthermore, the patchwork of regulation and laws that could provide some
deterrence for sending cease-and-desist letters is ineffective. Currently, the
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct,16
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, newly enacted state laws, and consumer
protection laws (as enforced by state attorneys general or the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)) have the potential to police abusive cease-and-desist
letters.17
However, this Article’s review of these potential forms of regulation
reveals severe limitations that allow abusive cease-and-desist letter senders to
virtually evade any form of legal consequence.18 Therefore, abusive letters
remain effective because the same incentives that encourage rights holders to
send abusive cease-and-desist letters disincentivize the targets to fight back.
Moreover, when abusive cease-and-desist letters are sent to small businesses
and individuals, it is almost certain that such targets will immediately
capitulate.19 The effectiveness of such letters is due to a confluence of three
factors that create a coercive settlement process—an abusive letter,
asymmetrical disputants, and certain characteristics of small businesses and
individuals.20
This Article argues that more effective and coordinated tools are needed
to police abusive cease-and-desist letters. Specifically, the approach needs to
directly address the characteristics of small businesses and individuals in
order to be successful. One such proposal is adopting federal or state
legislation, similar to the recently passed state-level, anti-patent troll
legislation,21 but with a broader focus. This “anti-abusive threats” legislation

15. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 65761 (2011)
(identifying three factors that lead to the unpredictability of trademark infringement lawsuits).
16. As enacted by individual states.
17. See infra Part III.
18. Id. One limitation includes the myopic focus on “patent trolls.” See infra Part III.C.
19. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478 (“Q: Why go after the little guy? A: Ease. It’s easy often.
You can often get them to roll over with a few threats and some sweet talk. . . . Threats means we’ll
sue your sorry little company if you don’t stop.”). See also William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals
for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 120607 (2008) (noting
that cease-and-desist letters are frequently effective); William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of
Trademark Misuse, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1547, 1569 (2006).
20. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478.
21. See Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS,
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-statepatent-legislation/ (last updated Apr. 17, 2015) (providing an interactive map of states with different
stages of anti-patent troll bills, showing that twenty-two states have signed legislation into law).
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would provide targeted parties with a cause of action against the sender of
an abusive letter. The legislation would provide for a “fast-track” resolution
of the abuse claim by a judge, as well as contain an attorneys’ fee-shifting
provision if the sender’s letter was deemed abusive.22 With the potential for
recovering attorneys fees and fast-track resolution, more attorneys would be
willing to represent small businesses and individuals on a contingency fee
basis.23 Adequate representation would assist in overcoming this population’s
inability to information-gather, as well as its susceptibility to inducement.24
Since adopting legislation may not be immediately forthcoming, and since it
does not combat all the characteristics of this vulnerable population, this
Article proposes supplemental, holistic measures that could also assist. These
proposals include greater involvement by state bar associations and the ABA
through issuing a formal ethics opinion regarding the direct applicability of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to abusive cease-and-desist letters.
Additionally, this Article proposes that state attorneys general should more
aggressively interpret their current consumer protection laws to allow them
to take further action against senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters.
Part I provides an overview of the cease-and-desist letter process and
defines this Article’s use of the term “abusive cease-and-desist letter.” Part II
discusses the characteristics of small businesses and individuals that render
them susceptible to these abusive letters. Part II also conducts an analysis of
the incentives that rights holders have to send an abusive letter. Part II
further examines the problems associated with sending abusive cease-anddesist letters, including philosophical concerns with coerced agreements. Part
III examines existing mechanisms that could serve to police abusive ceaseand-desist letters, including the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
recently enacted state legislation, but ultimately concludes that such
mechanisms do not effectively regulate this legal gray area.
In response, Part IV provides a number of proposals, including revised
federal and/or state legislation aimed at curbing abusive cease-and-desist
letters for all types of legal actions. Part V proactively addresses a number of
concerns that may be raised in response to these proposals, including the

22. See infra Part IV.A.4.
23. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 65657 (citing small businesses and individuals’ lack of
monetary resources as a hurdle to accessing adequate legal resources for intellectual property
disputes).
24. See Carrie Johnson, Rights Advocates See ‘Access to Justice’ Gap in the U.S., NPR (Mar. 10,
2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/10/288225649/rights-advocates-seeaccess-to-justice-gap-in-u-s (reporting on recent research conducted by Columbia Law School’s
Human Rights Clinic showing that individuals with access to counsel fare considerably better in
civil legal disputes).
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concern that implementing new legislation to combat abusive cease-anddesist letters may encourage additional litigiousness by plaintiffs’ attorneys.
However, Part V provides suggestions to counter these concerns. This Article
then briefly concludes that the problems in this area are serious enough to
outweigh the concerns.

I. The Cease-and-Desist Letter Process
Private dispute resolution is not a new phenomenon. A number of
empirical studies from the latter part of the twentieth century show that most
disputes are negotiated privately, without recourse to the judicial system.25
The current statistics of per capita civil litigation in the United States
supports this conclusion: only three percent of all civil disputes proceed to
litigation,26 and of this number, approximately one percent progress to a
judicially-determined result.27 Despite the actual statistics, the U.S.
reputation for litigiousness maintains its resonance.28 This Article asserts that
one of the answers to the paradox of the U.S. reputation for litigiousness is
the growing trend of settling disputes through cease-and-desist letters, and in
particular, the use of abusive cease-and-desist letters to coerce a private
settlement.29
Although there are few statistics to prove this overall trend, Professor
William Gallagher’s empirical study of the enforcement of intellectual

25. See DAVID M. TRUBEK, JOEL B. GROSSMAN, WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, HERBERT M.
KRITZER & AUSTIN SARAT, CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT S-7576
(University of Wisconsin Law School, 1983); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims,
and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 543 (19801981); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 6162
(1963).
26. See Landes, supra note 2, at 761.
27. This statistic only encompasses federal district court civil cases for the twelve month
period ending September 30, 2013. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS:
ANNUAL
REPORT
OF
THE
DIRECTOR
2013
tbl.
C-4,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/C04Sep13.pdf.
But see Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?,
6 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 111, 113 (2009) (suggesting a higher percentage goes to trial).
28. See supra note 1.
29. See infra Part III.C (providing “patent troll” cease-and-desist letters as an example of this
growing trend). See also infra Part I.B (defining “abusive” cease-and-desist letters). Cf. J. Mark
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Comparative Litigation Rates 3940 (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion
Paper
Series,
Discussion
Paper
No.
681,
2010),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_681.pdf (suggesting
that America’s reputation for litigiousness partly stems from the mishandling of securities class
action and mass tort lawsuits).
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property rights by attorneys offers some support.30 His qualitative study of
fifty-eight experienced intellectual property lawyers found that almost all
conducted their dispute resolution by using cease-and-desist letters, which
typically resulted in a privately negotiated settlement.31 In fact, only five of
these seasoned attorneys had ever actually litigated more than three cases.32
Additionally, more than one-third of the participants had never brought a
trademark or copyright case to trial over the course of their careers.33
Further, these participants admitted that where such letters are sent to small
businesses or individuals, strategically it was often more effective to be
“abusive.”34 One of the study’s conclusions was that the study participants
routinely enforced “weak” claims without any perceived ethical dilemma.35
In addition, recent state governmental actions against “patent trolls”36
that send abusive cease-and-desist letters to small businesses also provides
evidence for the conclusion that abusive cease-and-desist letters have been
on the rise.37 For example, the state attorneys general in New York,
Minnesota, Nebraska, and Vermont, have all taken action against a
notorious patent troll for sending abusive letters to small businesses within

30. See generally Gallagher, supra note 8. In addition, a counter-factual is also helpful as proof
of the growing trend. See also Megan Garber, This Cease-and-Desist Letter Should be the Model for Every
Cease-and-Desist Letter, THE ATLANTIC (July 23, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2012/07/this-cease-and-desist-letter-should-be-the-model-for-every-ceaseand-desist-letter/260170/#. It was speculated that this cease-and-desist letter will go down in
history as the “most polite, encouraging and empathetic” letter ever to be sent, and was a viral
Internet sensation. Debra Cassens Weiss, Jack Daniel’s Cease-and-Desist Letter Goes Viral for Being
Exceedingly Polite, A.B.A. J. (July 26, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article
/jack_daniels_cease-and-desist_letter_goes_viral_for_being_exceeedingly_poli/.
31. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 465, 48182.
32. Id. at 465. Professor Gallagher excluded Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
trials from counting as litigation since such trials are not conducted in person. Id. at 465 n.52. The
low number of surveyed attorneys having litigation experience could partially be due to the fact
that some simply preferred a transactional practice—if cases did not settle, some would refer cases
to a more seasoned litigator instead of handling it themselves. Id. at 465 n.53.
33. Id. at 465. The range of the survey participants’ experience in intellectual property
enforcement ranged from five to forty years. Id.
34. While the study participants do not use the term “abusive,” the manner in which they
enforce rights against low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and individuals can be
deemed abusive under this Article’s definition. See id. at 478; see also infra Part I.B.
35. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 496.
36. See sources cited supra note 12.
37. These state-level governmental actions have been in the form of legislation for “bad faith
assertions of patent infringement” and state attorneys general actions against certain patent trolls
for sending abusive letters. See, e.g., 9 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195 (West 2015); N.Y. Press Release,
supra note 13.
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their states.38
While Professor Gallagher’s numbers are restricted to a small sample of
intellectual property attorneys, and the governmental actions have been
limited, there are enough anecdotes to support the conclusion that the rise of
abusive cease-and-desist letters are not limited to the intellectual property
field.39 Unfortunately, abusive cease-and-desist letters are most problematic
when the letters target low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and
individuals.

A. Overview of the Cease-and-Desist Letter Process
The Internet has been one of the main drivers for the increased use of
cease-and-desist letters in legal dispute resolution. Potential violations of
one’s rights are easily discoverable with specialized software or even by
conducting a quick Google search.40 This means that previously unknown
violations of rights can now be detected, which causes a dilemma for the
party whose rights may have been violated by a third party: Should they
enforce their rights or ignore the purported violation? One of the reasons for
the overall rise in cease-and-desist letters in some areas of the law, like
intellectual property, is the misconception that rights holders need to enforce
each and every single perceived violation of their rights or they risk losing
them.41
The actual cease-and-desist letter process is fairly straightforward. After
discovering a perceived legal right violation, an individual or entity sends a
letter to the violator, identifying the entity’s rights and the unlawful actions
of the violator. The letter will demand that the violator cease and desist in its
actions.42 Depending on the type of violation, the letter may demand
38. Julie Samuels, It’s a Bad Week to be a Patent Troll: Big Updates from New York and Newegg, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/its-bad-week-bepatent-troll-big-updates-new-york-newegg.
39. See, e.g., Cease and Desist Letters, ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/tag/ceaseand-desist-letters/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) (showcasing abusive cease-and-desist letters covering
various legal claims).
40. See, e.g., BitMatch, S.A.F.E., http://www.safe-corp.biz/products_bitmatch.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2015).
41. Cf. Devan R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1833 (2007); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:91 (4th ed. 2014).
42. There are a number of websites with template cease-and-desist letters. See, e.g., Cease &
Desist Letter Templates, Examples & Sample Forms, THOMPSON HALL SANTI CERNY & DOOLEY,
http://thompsonhall.com/cease-desist-letter-template-example-sample-forms/ (last visited Mar.
16, 2015); Cease and Desist Letter Template, ROCKETLAWYER, https://www.rocketlawyer.com
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additional actions be taken (i.e., removal of defamatory language on a
website).43 Additionally, the letter will typically contain a threat, either
implicit or explicit, that if the target does not respond to the letter, the sender
will investigate its legal remedies, which may include litigation. Upon receipt
of the cease-and-desist letter, the recipient has a choice to either comply with
the demands or fight back.44 Compliance is typically achieved through
entering into some type of settlement agreement, whether through an
affidavit of compliance by the target, or a more extensive negotiated
agreement.45 Although there are no statistics available on the success rate of
cease-and-desist letters, anecdotally, it appears that the vast majority of
disputes begin and end with the cease-and-desist letter, particularly where
the letter is abusive.46
There are two noteworthy aspects of the typical cease-and-desist letter
process. First, the cease-and-desist letter process is typically conducted
between asymmetrical disputants. Although entities of all sizes enforce their
legal rights, it appears that the larger the company, the more likely it is to
initiate court action or arbitration.47 The reason for this is that well-resourced
entities typically have the funds to either hire outside legal counsel or
maintain a staff of in-house attorneys.48 Second, as settlement is the typical
outcome of cease-and-desist letters, the whole process is conducted outside
of the judicial system. This fact raises the importance of non-judicially related
laws and needed regulations in this area. However, there are currently no

/article/cease-and-desist-letter-template.rl (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
43. The violation can vary from defamation, harassment, breach of contract, to infringement
of an intellectual property right. See Cease & Desist Letter Templates, Examples & Sample Forms,
THOMPSON HALL SANTI CERNY & DOOLEY, supra note 42.
44. Defending oneself against a claim of legal rights violations can involve formal legal
actions, like filing for a declaratory judgment, or informal actions, like public shaming. See Grinvald,
supra note 15, at 631; see also Part III.B.1 (discussing declaratory judgment actions). The use of public
shaming can be successful, however, it requires certain factors to be present for its success. Grinvald,
supra note 15, at 66667 (discussing the four factors required for a successful shaming campaign
against a trademark bully).
45. See, e.g., Letter from Anessa Owen Kramer, Partner, Honigman, Miller, Schwartz &
Cohn LLP, to Jeff Britton, Owner, Exit 6 Pub and Brewery LLC (Dec. 9, 2013) (on file with author)
(requesting written assurances of compliance to demands contained in letter); Settlement
Agreement, Estate of James Joyce and Carol Loeb Shloss, Mar. 19, 2007, available at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/Shloss%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf
(settling
copyright infringement claims).
46. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478.
47. FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, SECOND ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY:
FINDINGS 8 (2005).
48. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 65556.
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effective laws and regulations for cease-and-desist letters, placing a great deal
of discretion upon the senders to appropriately draft such letters and
negotiate a fair settlement.49 Unfortunately, there are a variety of incentives
that encourage sending abusive cease-and-desist letters in order to guarantee
a non-judicial, or private, settlement.50 Prior to discussing these incentives, it
is important to understand the elements that make a cease-and-desist letter
“abusive.”

B. Defining Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters
While not all cease-and-desist letters are abusive, an informal review of
cease-and-desist letters posted on public websites reveal that the average
cease-and-desist letter is not a friendly, merit-worthy missive intended to
encourage a non-adversarial or fair settlement.51 Contained within almost all
cease-and-desist letters is a threat of litigation (either implicit or explicit). This
threat alone does not cause the letter to be abusive; rather, it is this threat,
combined with one or more factors that create the abuse. This section will
outline four factors that can create an abusive letter, however, these factors
are not exclusive and the absence of one factor does not automatically mean
a letter is not abusive. Ultimately, it is the totality of the letter that determines
its characterization.
1. Inappropriate Legalese, or Other Harsh and Insulting
Language
Lawyers often write using legalese or “lawyerly” language.52 Using
legalese may be appropriate at times, such as when quoting from a statute,53
however, when communicating with non-lawyers, the legal profession has
come to find that legalese is not only unnecessary, but often completely

49. See infra Part III (discussing the ineffectiveness of current enforcement efforts).
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. See, e.g., Cease and Desist Letters, ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 39 (showcasing abusive ceaseand-desist letters). This Article acknowledges that the letters that receive media attention are likely
going to be reflective of extreme abuse, as to be deemed newsworthy.
52. “Legalese” is defined as “the specialized language of the legal profession that is [usually]
complicated and often unintelligible to an outsider.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY
1290 (unabr. ed. 1986).
53. Although some plain English activists would disagree with this. See Andy Mergendahl,
Legal Writing in Plain English as Culture War, LAWYERIST (May 11, 2013),
http://lawyerist.com/64667/legal-writing-in-plain-english-a-culture-wa/ (“[F]or a number of
reasons, florid, complex writing strewn with legalese does a poor job of communicating, whether
the reader is a lawyer, judge, or layperson (like a client).”).
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unwarranted.54 For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission
requires that disclosure documents are written in “plain English,” and urges
the profession to push for clarity in drafting all documents.55 Distinguishing
between appropriate legalese and inappropriate legalese is challenging;
however, when a cease-and-desist letter is sent to a non-lawyer, this Article
argues that using legalese is always inappropriate. There is no reason to use
legalese other than as an intimidation tactic, and a cease-and-desist letter can
easily convey its seriousness in plain English.
Additionally, inappropriate use of legalese also includes citing to legal
authority without referencing the substance of the law56 when the letter is
sent to a non-lawyer.57 Similar to using Latin phrases or lawyerly language,
lawyers cite to laws in an attempt to provide legitimacy to the legal claims.
This tactic is particularly useful where the claims are meritless or weak.
Where the letter is sent to another attorney, simply including a citation to the
relevant law is warranted, as attorneys have the resources to find the citation.
However, where the letter is sent to a non-lawyer, it is unlikely that the
recipient will be able to access the cited law or have the resources to hire a
lawyer to do so for them.58 Therefore, legal citations without inclusion of the
source are simply an attempt at intimidating the target to capitulate to the
letter’s demands.
While including a copy of the cited law in a cease-and-desist makes sense
where it is sent to a non-lawyer, critics may argue otherwise. Critics may
argue that even when the sender attaches a copy of the cited statute to the
letter, it is unlikely that a non-lawyer target would be able to interpret the
law due to the complicated language found in most statutes. While this
criticism has merit, including a substantiated statutory citation gives the
target the opportunity to read and attempt to interpret the law (or find a
friend or family member to do so on their behalf).
Further, harsh or insulting language is also a contributing factor to

54. See, e.g., Nora Rock, Five Good Reasons to Avoid “Legalese,” PRACTICEPRO (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://avoidaclaim.com/2014/five-good-reasons-to-avoid-legalese/.
55. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO
CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS (1998).
56. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 628. Including quotations, hyperlinks, or attachments of
the cited statutory authority are all acceptable methods of referring to the law.
57. See, e.g., Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, Partner, Jones Day, to Registrant of
www.kevynorr.com (June 10, 2014) (on file with author) (“Continued unauthorized use of these
marks constitutes, at a minimum, service mark infringement, service mark dilution, and false
description in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. and state law.”).
58. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 64849.
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determining whether a letter is abusive. In fact, the dictionary defines
“abusive” as “employing harsh or insulting language.”59 While using
insulting language is not frequently seen in letters containing inappropriate
legalese, it is important to note that harsh or insulting language is never
appropriate in a letter asserting one’s legal rights.60
2. Demands for Quick Settlement
A demand to complete a transaction at once is the hallmark of a
coercive settlement and is arguably one of the most common traits of abusive
cease-and-desist letters.61 For example, in Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist.,62 the
California Court of Appeal noted the fact that Mr. Odorizzi was coerced into
resigning his job because his employer demanded that he resign immediately,
without time for reflection or outside counsel, was an important factor in
potentially voiding the agreement.63 Typically, an abusive cease-and-desist
letter demands that a target respond within a very short time frame, often
between three and fourteen days.64 For example, one abusive letter stated,
“The complaint is prepared, and we will file it next week if we do not receive
an acceptable response from you [in five days].”65 One week does not provide
a target with any meaningful time to find an attorney. Even if a target were
to retain an attorney, this type of short time frame does not allow the attorney
to conduct a thorough analysis of the claims or prepare a response letter by
the stated deadline.66 In this situation, the only viable option for a target is to
capitulate and accede to the demands of the letter, regardless of the legal
merits of the claims.
While there is some value to the counter-argument that providing a
short time frame in a cease-and-desist letter is necessary to ensure that a

59. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 8 (unabr. ed. 1986).
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2013). A lawyer has the obligation
to maintain “a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal
system.” Id.
61. The recently enacted state anti-patent troll laws also include this item as a factor in
determining a “bad faith” assertion of patent infringement. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 481703(2)(d) (West 2014).
62. 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
63. See id. at 541 (characterizing the demand as exerting undue influence).
64. See, e.g., Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, supra note 57 (giving target three days to
respond); Letter from Anessa Owen Kramer, supra note 45 (giving the target two weeks to respond).
65. Letter from Robert W. Payne, Attorney, LaRiviere, Grubman & Payne LLP, to Michael
Shkolnik (June 7, 2002) (on file with author).
66. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 64849.
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target takes the sender’s demands seriously, other benchmarks provide
enough time for retention of an attorney, and for the attorney to conduct a
proper analysis and response.67 For example, Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides a minimum timeframe of twenty-one days for a
defendant to respond to a newly filed summons and complaint.68 The
circumstances of a newly sued defendant is similar to that of a cease-anddesist letter recipient—both need time to retain an attorney, and the attorney
needs time to draft a response. Unlike cease-and-desist letter recipients,
however, litigation defendants have an opportunity to request additional
response time from the court.69 Because the cease-and-desist letter process is
extra-judicial, letter recipients do not have this ability. Therefore, a
timeframe similarly given to litigating defendants, if not longer, is needed for
the cease-and-desist letter process, and any letter demanding anything less
than the standard twenty-one days should be considered abusive.
3. Demands for Immediate Payment of Fees
Similar to demanding settlement within a short timeframe, a demand
for immediate payment of fees within a cease-and-desist letter is another
factor that strongly favors characterizing the letter as abusive.70 The type of
fees demanded differs depending on the particular claims. Some letters
demand payment of licensing fees or attorneys’ fees, in addition to the target’s
capitulation, in order for the sender to not file a lawsuit against the target.
For example, the patent troll, MPHJ Technology, routinely sent cease-anddesist letters to small businesses demanding a license fee between $900 and
$1,200 per employee in order for the target to continue to use its scanning
technology.71 In essence, the demand for fees in exchange for not filing a
lawsuit is akin to extortion, particularly where the sender of the letter has no

67. For example, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) typically provides
trademark and patent applicants with six months to respond to an office action (a letter from an
attorney at the USPTO regarding the application). See MPEP § 710.01 (9th ed. Mar. 2014).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b). While a request for additional time from the court may typically be
made after the opposing party denies an extension, the ability to request the court for this additional
time exists, and is not present in situations of cease-and-desist letters.
70. Also similar to the short time frame item, this item is also cited as a factor in determining
a bad faith assertion of patent infringement in the recently enacted state anti-patent troll laws. See,
e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-1703(2)(d) (West 2014).
71. See Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—For Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 2,
2013),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-usingscanners/.
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intention of filing a lawsuit.72 Some states recognize that extortion is
actionable even where the threats are of unfounded civil prosecution.73
4. Weak or Unreasonable Claims of Rights Violations
“Weak” or “unreasonable” claims of rights violations are easy to
identify at the extremes. For example, a claim alleging that a target had used
the accuser’s trademarks to sell counterfeit products (but were, in fact,
advertising the resale of genuine products), is a weak claim.74 Another
example is a claim, which alleges trademark infringement by a company that
began using the mark after the alleged infringer.75
Where weak or unreasonable claims become harder to identify are
borderline claims. These types of claims, at first, may appear mildly plausible,
but after applying the target’s potential legal defenses, the claims become
weak or even unreasonable.76 For example, Louis Vuitton sent a cease-anddesist letter to the University of Pennsylvania School of Law (the “Law
School”), claiming that a flyer publicizing the school’s symposium on Fashion
Law infringed and diluted Louis Vuitton’s trademarks.77 The flyer’s
background consisted of a design that was reminiscent of the famous “LV”
logo, but had been changed to “TM” and “.”78 At first, Louis Vuitton’s
claims seem plausible, as Louis Vuitton and the LV logo are famous
trademarks, and the flyer’s background clearly intended to evoke a

72. See
Extortion
Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/extortion (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) (“[T]he crime of
obtaining money or some other thing of value by the abuse of one’s office or authority.”).
73. See, e.g., Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 113637 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
74. See Apple Computer Inc. v. Micro Team, No. C 98-20164 PVT, 2000 WL 1897354, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2000) (“Once the trademark holder sells his product, the buyer ordinarily
may resell the product under the original mark without incurring any trademark liability.”).
75. This is a weak claim because the alleged infringer would have “priority” under trademark
law. Priority in trademark law is usually determined by which party first uses the mark in commerce.
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 909 (2015).
76. See Lara Pearson, Alex Butterman, Leah Chan Grinvald, Natalie Sulimani & Chris
Wheeler, ‘Trademark Bullying’—Time to Get Some Clear Definitions, 44 WORLD TRADEMARK REV. 92,
94 (Aug.Sept. 2013) (discussing the Louis Vuitton example).
77. See Letter from Michael Pantalony, Dir. of Civil Enforcement, Louis Vuitton Malletier,
to Michael A. Fitts, Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Feb. 29, 2012), available at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/lv_letter.pdf. The language used in the
letter is insulting: “I would have thought the Penn Intellectual Property group, and its faculty
advisors, would understand the basics of intellectual property law and know better than to infringe
and dilute the famous trademarks of fashion brands, including the LV Trademarks, for a
symposium on fashion law.” Id.
78. See id. (including the flyer as Exhibit A).
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connection to the brand since the symposium’s topic was fashion law.79 Due
to this superficial plausibility, an Associate Dean at the Law School requested
that the students immediately change the flyer.80 However, on closer
inspection of both the letter’s claims and the Law School’s use of the LV logo,
it became more apparent that neither a likelihood of confusion81 was present,
nor was the Law School using the mark for a commercial purpose.82 After
the Associate General Counsel of the Law School sent Louis Vuitton an
explanation of its defenses, Louis Vuitton dropped its claim.83
Asserting weak or unreasonable claims establishes a cease-and-desist
letter as abusive because it takes advantage of the legal system, particularly
when the sender knows its claims have little or no merit. In such situations,
the sender is unlikely to file a lawsuit against the target, or if such lawsuit is
filed, it is likely frivolous.84 To effectuate its demands, the sender depends on
the target’s desire to avoid the stress of litigation (where the target is a wellresourced entity), or the target’s fear and ignorance of litigation (where the
target is a low-resourced entity, such as a small business or individual).85

79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012) (“[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of
the mark’s owner.”).
80. See Letter from Robert F. Firestone, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, University of Pennsylvania
Law School, to Michael Pantalony, Dir. of Civil Enforcement, Louis Vuitton Malletier (Mar. 2,
2012), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/penn_ogc_letter.pdf
(referencing the email sent by Steven Barnes, Associate Dean for Communications of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (“Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged
by such act.”).
82. See id. § 1125(c)(3) (“The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment under this subsection . . . (C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.”).
83. See Letter from Robert F. Firestone, supra note 80.
84. For example, the troll, MPHJ Technology, sent initial cease and desist letters to over
16,000 small businesses from December 2012 to May 2013. See Joe Mullin, Patent Stunner: Under
Attack, Nation’s Most Notorious “Troll” Sues Federal Gov’t, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/patent-stunner-under-attack-nations-mostnotorious-troll-sues-federal-govt/. After over a year of threats, MPHJ filed its first actual lawsuit in
November 2013. See Joe Mullin, Notorious “Scan-to-Email” Patents Go Big, Sue Coca-Cola and Dillard’s,
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/notorious-scan-toemail-patents-go-big-sue-coca-cola-and-dillards/.
85. See Mullin, supra note 71 (reporting that one targeted company acceded to the demands
of a patent troll without asking any questions in order to avoid conflict while it was in the process
of being acquired).
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Unfortunately, a number of incentives motivate senders to distribute
abusive cease-and-desist letters.86 Where the targets of abusive cease-anddesist letters are low-resourced entities, policy makers and the legal
community should be concerned about the effectiveness of abusive ceaseand-desist letters causing numerous de facto coerced agreements, a reduction
in marketplace competition, and an increase in private censorship of speech.

II. Characteristics, Incentives, and Problems
Some advocates of the private settlement process argue that resolving
legal disputes without litigation is beneficial because it reflects the projected
outcome of a judicial trial without imposing costs on society.87 Litigation is
expensive, particularly in the intellectual property area.88 Therefore, as a
theoretical matter, private settlements could be beneficial to society.89
However, this is not the case in situations of asymmetrical disputants. The
argument that a private settlement merely projects the outcome of litigation
is premised on a faulty assumption of symmetrical bargaining power.90
Disputes occur between and among parties of all sizes. Where there is
economic or social disparity between the disputing parties, unregulated
private settlements are likely to be considered coercive and not beneficial to
society, as noted by Yale Law Professor Owen Fiss in his influential
Comment entitled, “Against Settlement.”91
Professor Fiss argues that three characteristics of low-resource litigants
affect the settlement process, which increases the probability of settlement:
(1) an inability to information-gather, (2) a susceptibility to inducement, and
(3) an inability to finance the litigation.92 Due to these traits, Professor Fiss
argues that private settlements are not appropriate because of the lack of

86. See infra Part II.B.
87. See Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe—And for
the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1996) (“The enforcement of legal rights consumes real resources,
including . . . indirect costs to the extent that rights are enforceable against socially productive
activities, or impose socially burdensome duties, or protect socially harmful activities.”).
88. See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 3436 (2013)
[hereinafter AIPLA 2013 REPORT] (reporting that in 2013, costs associated with intellectual
property litigation ranged from $300,000 to $6,000,000, depending on the type of case and value).
89. See generally Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 371
(1986) (discussing the externalities to society from private litigation).
90. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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judicial involvement in the process.93 Coupled with the incentives to send
abusive cease-and-desist letters, low-resourced targets are left vulnerable to a
coercive settlement process that begins with an abusive cease-and-desist
letter.
Coercion is considered an anathema in the law, and theoretically
coerced settlements are recognized as ineffective manifestations of consent.94
Practically, coerced settlements generated from abusive cease-and-desist
letters are detrimental to society because they reduce market competition,
and consequently, consumer choice.95 Additionally, abusive cease-and-desist
letters chill free speech and provide private parties with a mechanism for
censoring unfavorable speech.96

A. Characteristics of Small Businesses and Individuals
Although Professor Fiss’s Comment primarily focuses on the
characteristics of low-resourced litigation plaintiffs, the same characteristics
apply in the cease-and-desist letter process, where the concern is on lowresourced targets, namely small businesses or individuals. As stated above,
these two populations share the same characteristics that often lead to a quick
settlement, regardless of the merits.97
1. Inability to Information-Gather
Information regarding the legal aspects of a dispute, such as the relevant
laws and cases, is needed in order to effectively assess one’s chances of success
in a legal dispute. Just as crucial, however, is the non-legal information
regarding the opposing party, such as the resources of the other party and
the party’s penchant for litigation. All of this information should be assessed
together to formulate a strategy for the dispute (whether to send a demand

93. See id. at 107778.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation of
assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable
alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”). See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 292 (8th ed. 2006) (“It must, to constitute a contract, appear
that two minds were at one . . . .”) (quoting Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463, 472 (1876)).
95. See Marcus Wohlsen, Patent Trolls are Killing Startups—Except When They’re Saving Them,
WIRED (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/09/patent-trolls-versus-startups/
(reporting on the lawsuit filed by 1-800-Contacts against Ditto, a small startup competitor). See also
infra Part II.C.2.
96. See Rebecca Curtin, SLAPPing Patent Trolls: What Anti-Trolling Legislation Can Learn from the
Anti-SLAPP Movement, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
97. See infra Part II.C.3.
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letter, bring or defend a lawsuit, settle, etc.).98 For example, a party with a
strong legal claim facing an opponent without a litigious reputation should
maintain a strong negotiating position. However, if the opposing party is
litigious and well-resourced, then it may be more advantageous for the
claimant to settle. But conducting effective information-gathering to obtain
this information consumes resources, particularly, financial resources, of
which a low-resourced entity likely has little.99 Therefore, upon receipt of a
cease-and-desist letter, a small business or individual would likely make a
relatively uninformed decision to merely comply with the letter’s demands.100
2. Susceptibility to Inducement
For small businesses and individuals, a cease-and-desist letter may not
only be an ominous sign of expensive legal bills, but also an emotional
firestorm. Over 78 percent of all small businesses in the United States are
sole proprietors.101 This means that for the majority of small businesses, the
only employee is the business owner herself.102 Based on this information, a
cease-and-desist letter could be viewed as a personal attack on the business
proprietor, rather than an impersonal business interaction. For example, one
small business owner who received a cease-and-desist letter from the
National Football League stated that the letter initially “scared the bejesus
out of [her].”103 This leaves a small business or individual emotionally more
susceptible to inducement to settle the legal dispute privately.
3. Follow-through
The appeals process is one aspect of the U.S. judicial system that
increases the costs of litigation.104 Even if a party wins at the trial court level,

98. See Bret Rappaport, A Shot Across the Bow: How to Write an Effective Demand Letter, 35 J. ASS’N
LEGAL WRITING DIR. 32, 3637 (2008).
99. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 649. While some small businesses may have business
insurance that could cover intellectual property infringement litigation, it is highly unlikely that
individuals (such as bloggers or artists) would have insurance coverage for such claims. See id. at 649
n.141.
100. See generally Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997)
(providing examples an explanations regarding this asymmetrical information model).
101. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 654.
102. Id. at 65455.
103. Melinda Deslatte, ‘Who Dat’ Shirts CAN Be Sold: NFL Clarifies Saints Gear Position,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/01/who-datshirts-can-be-sol_n_445291.html.
104. See Kim Tung, Reducing the Costs of Litigation: Appeals, PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST.,
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there are generally two levels of appeals that the case could go through.105
Even if a low-resourced entity is able to finance a lawsuit through the trial
court proceeding, it may not be able to follow the case through on appeal.
Additionally, once a lawsuit has begun, defendants at all stages have difficulty
withdrawing without the consent of the plaintiff (which often comes at a high
cost, if at all).106 Further, the consequences for not defending oneself are
harsh—default judgment.107 This means that a low-resourced entity is likely
to settle early, even if it has a strong defense, as it would be unlikely to have
the funds to defend itself to the end of the litigation.
Based on these three characteristics, Professor Fiss argues that private
settlements between asymmetrical parties are inherently coercive and
cautions against a wholesale adoption of rules that force parties to privately
settle their legal disputes.108 This Article takes a more nuanced approach to
private settlements between parties with resource disparity, and argues that
the three characteristics place low-resourced entities at greater risk for
coercive settlements. However, not all private settlements between unequal
parties are necessarily coercive; instead, in the cease-and-desist letter process,
it is the abusive letter combined with the asymmetry and the three
characteristics that creates the coercion. The question then becomes one of
why: Why would someone want to send an abusive letter?

B. Incentives
There are a number of economic, legal, and practical factors that
incentivize entities to knowingly send abusive letters to small businesses and
individuals. Four notable factors are (1) the costs of litigation and (2) its
uncertainty, (3) the lack of legal consequences for sending abusive letters, and
(4) the letter’s effectiveness in obtaining the desired outcome.
http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/appeal.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). Tung’s
article poses the questions: “What is wrong with the appellate system?” and “Why does it cost so
much, but run so slowly?” See id.
105. See U.S. Court System, SYRACUSE UNIV. MAXWELL SCH. OF CITIZENSHIP & PUB.
AFFAIRS, http://www2.maxwell.syr.edu/plegal/scales/court.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). Even
if the case is administrative, like an inter partes patent reexamination, the cost of seeing the case
through to appeals is quite high, relative to the initial costs ($50,000 versus $250,000). AIPLA 2013
REPORT, supra note 88, at 36.
106. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A) (“A defendant must serve an answer . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise,
the clerk must enter the party’s default.”).
108. Fiss, supra note 90, at 1075.
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1. Costs of Litigation
The economic costs of litigation have been widely discussed in academic
and policy literature.109 Engaging in litigation is expensive and timeconsuming. For example, an average infringement lawsuit for a patent
valued at less than $1 million costs $350,000 to $700,000 to litigate, without
accounting for any appeals.110 Part of the expense of litigation is the time it
takes from initiation to verdict.111 One empirical study of federal courts found
that the average length of a civil lawsuit ranged from one to two years during
the period of 197186.112 Generally, a sender of cease-and-desist letters is
aware of these costs, as it is oftentimes a target itself.113
For example, Intel is both a major enforcer of its intellectual property
rights as well as a target of others’ enforcement efforts. Intel estimates that it
receives between 100 and 150 cease-and-desist letters per month from patent
holders claiming that it infringes on their rights.114 Due to the high costs of
litigation, rights holders have a strong incentive to resolve disputes privately
through cease-and-desist letters.115 While the costs of privately resolving an
intellectual property rights dispute are unknown, it is likely much less
expensive than litigation.116 Therefore, there is a high economic incentive for
targets to settle immediately upon receiving a cease-and-desist letter.
2. Uncertainty of Litigation
In addition to the high costs of litigation, the uncertain outcome
presented by many types of claims is another incentive to send cease-anddesist letters. Particularly, litigation outcomes in intellectual property
disputes are hard to predict, even for seasoned litigators. The reason for this
difficulty differs for each area of intellectual property. For example, in patent

109. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 87, at 2; Kathleen Engelmann & Bradford Cornell, Measuring
The Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 37888 (1988); David M.
Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1993).
110. See AIPLA 2013 REPORT, supra note 88, at 34.
111. See TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1990) (discussing the concern regarding caseload
increases in federal district courts leading to delay and a consequent denial of justice to the parties).
112. Id. at 20.
113. See Trimble, supra note 7, at 787 (discussing the following Intel example).
114. Id. (citing Intel’s General Counsel).
115. See FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, supra note 47, at 15 (listing intellectual property
disputes as one of the most costly types of litigation).
116. See id.
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cases, some of the uncertainty stems from the claim construction that the
district court adopts during a “Markman” hearing,117 whereas in trademark
law, the uncertainty can stem from the various defenses a defendant may
have, or the strength of the plaintiff’s mark.118 Additionally, rights holders
may be apprehensive about enforcing a claim in court due to the court’s
ability to invalidate intellectual property rights.119 Similar to the high costs of
litigation, outcome uncertainty incentivizes rights holders to ensure that they
privately settle with the targets of their letters.
3. Effectiveness
While the empirical data on the effectiveness of abusive cease-and-desist
letters is fairly non-existent, anecdotal evidence emphatically supports the
conclusion that abusive letters are effective particularly when they are sent to
low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and individuals.120 The
reason for such effectiveness is the confluence of factors discussed above—
the abusive language contained in the letter, asymmetrical disputants, and
the characteristics of the low-resourced entities121—that creates a coercive
117. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (“[W]e see the
importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate
all issues of construction to the court.”). See also Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary
Judgment, and Judicial Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 104 (2005) (“The early interpretation
of the scope of a patent claim can be used for subsequently deciding issues of both patent validity
and infringement.”); David v. Goliath: Clinic Takes Early Victory Against Lowe’s, SUFFOLK UNIV. LAW
SCH. (June 4, 2014), http://www.suffolk.edu/news/52901.php (“[C]laim construction defines the
scope of the patent and, in many cases, can greatly influence the ultimate outcome of the case.”).
118. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 638, 66061. The scope of trademark protection is based
on the strength of the trademark. Id. at 638. The stronger the trademark is, the wiper scope of
protection. Id.; see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“The strength of a mark is determined by its placement on a ‘continuum of marks from “generic,”
afforded no protection; through “descriptive” or “suggestive,” given moderate protection; to
“arbitrary” or “fanciful” awarded maximum protection.’”) (quoting Nutri/System, Inc. v. ConStan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 1987)). Compare Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle
Assocs., Inc., 332 F.2d 534, 54041 (3d Cir. 1964) (holding that the “Family Circle” trademark was
not strong enough to enjoin unauthorized third-party uses in product categories other than in the
plaintiff’s business of magazines), with The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA)
1629, 1641–42 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (holding that “Arden B” was a famous trademark and the plaintiff
could enjoin third-party uses of the mark in product categories outside of plaintiff’s products).
119. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445,
457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that plaintiff’s trademark for its “Red Sole” was non-distinctive and
ordering its cancellation), rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206, 228 (2d Cir. 2012) (overturning the district
court’s decision on non-distinctiveness, but limiting the trademark to where the Red Sole is
contrasted with the outside color of the shoe).
120. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478.
121. See supra Parts I.B.14, II.A.
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environment where the low-resourced entity has no choice but to accede to
the demands of the cease-and-desist letter. It is important to note that abusive
cease-and-desist letters are also effective when sent to well-resourced entities.
This may be attributed to a number of factors, but for some well-resourced
entities, the costs (financial and human capital) of engaging in litigation may
outweigh any benefit obtained by receiving a favorable outcome.122 While
abusive letters are problematic even if the disputants are in symmetry, this
situation is not overly worrisome because there is no coercion. Wellresourced parties are able to information-gather in order to make an
informed decision to settle with an intellectual property rights holder.123
4. Lack of Legal Consequences
Due to its extra-judicial nature, abusive cease-and-desist letters do not
come within the purview of the legal protections against abusive litigants,
such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 sanctions.124 Outside
of the judicial sphere, abusive cease-and-desist letters do not squarely fit
within other regulatory schemes. One exception is where a patent troll sends
an abusive letter in bad faith.125 This narrow situation directly implicates
recent legislation passed by approximately twenty-two states, but as discussed
in Part III.C, this legislation would not assist where the abusive letter was
sent in good faith.126
122. See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees in Trademark and Unfair Competition
Litigation, 2 LANDSLIDE 14, 17 (MayJune 2010) (concluding that since the possibility of attorneys’
fees may influence the decision to settle, attorneys need to take into consideration that attorneys’
fee awards are a low likelihood in trademark litigation). Willingness to settle is particularly the case
in intellectual property law where judges have the discretion to impose attorneys’ fees on the losing
party in “exceptional cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). Imposing attorneys’ fees is not the norm,
and judges go out of their way to deny such awards. See, e.g., Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Lee, 547 F.
Supp. 2d 685, 697 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (declining to award fees despite finding of willful infringement
in context of award of statutory damages); Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 76 U.S.P.Q.D.2d
(BNA) 1302, 1309 (D. Nev. 2004) (declining to award fees despite defendant’s continued
infringement in violation of temporary restraining order), rev’d in part on other grounds, 452 F.3d 1126
(9th Cir. 2006). See also Davis, supra, at 14.
123. Furthermore, a well-resourced party may be able to negotiate a coexistence agreement
depending on the claims of the intellectual property rights holder. See Marianna Moss, Trademark
“Coexistence” Agreements: Legitimate Contracts or Tools of Consumer Deception?, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
197, 199 (2005) (“In order to coexist in the market ‘peacefully,’ companies with potentially
infringing trademarks sometimes enter into coexistence agreements, which allow them to continue
marketing their products to the public without the fear of defending a trademark infringement
lawsuit.”).
124. See infra Part III.B.2.
125. See Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, supra note 21.
126. See id. (identifying the following states as having passed legislation addressing bath faith
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Aside from the narrow anti-patent troll laws, the only legal consequence
for sending abusive cease-and-desist letters appears to be remote: the risk that
the target files for a declaratory judgment action or publicly shames the
sender. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that a small business or individual will be
able to file a declaratory judgment action against a sender of an abusive
cease-and-desist letter due to the high costs involved.127 While public
shaming is a low-cost alternative to litigation and can be an effective
bargaining tool, a number of variables contribute to its success.128 Therefore,
shaming may not be available to all targets of abusive cease-and-desist letters.
Additionally, recent work on prospect theory and the endowment effect
shows that some senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters may not be
rational actors, and, as a consequence, are likely unshamable.129 As a result,
there are currently few, if any, direct legal consequences from sending an
abusive cease-and-desist letter. While some forms of regulation could police
abusive cease-and-desist letters, it is necessary to understand the problems
associated with abusive cease-and-desist letters.

C. Why are Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters Problematic?
This Article has established that cease-and-desist letters may lead to
coerced settlement agreements.130 Coercion is problematic on many different
levels. Philosophically, coercion in a negotiation process invalidates any
resulting agreement on moral grounds.131 However, due to the characteristics

patent infringement assertions: Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin). See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-771(a) (West 2014) (“A person shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent
infringement.”).
127. See infra Part III.B.1.
128. Some of these variables are shared norms of a community in which the target of shaming
is a part, and the vulnerability to shaming by the shaming target. Grinvald, supra note 15, at 66668.
129. See Jessica M. Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in Trademark
Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 242 (2014) (“Calling the trademarks ‘crown
jewels,’ or viewing them as on par with tangible property, illustrates the tendency of trademark
owners to elevate the status of trademarks to something more significant than mere business assets.
The inherent nature of trademarks lends itself easily to the errors associated with the endowment
effect. Since this psychological effect can impact rational decision making, it should be taken into
consideration by anyone seeking to deter trademark bullying.”).
130. See supra text accompanying note 20.
131. See Claire Finkelstein, Contract Under Coercion: Should You Keep a Contract with a
Robber?
3
(Sept.
30,
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Contracts_Under_Coercion_CFinkelstein_093010.pdf;
Mark Fowler, Coercion and Practical Reason, 8 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 329, 330 (1982).
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of low-resourced entities, it is unlikely that a coerced agreement would be
invalidated—creating de facto enforcement. Economically, an agreement
based on coercion is anti-competitive and reduces consumer choice in the
marketplace. More generally, abusive cease-and-desist letters are
problematic because they increase the power of private censorship by wellresourced entities.
1. Coercion Invalidates
It is well-settled contract doctrine that coercion invalidates
agreements.132 The theoretical rationale for this is that coercion clouds the
free will and the thought process of the coerced party, such that the consent
given is invalid.133 Under this reasoning, even if the choice made by the
coerced party is advisable or intentional, the choice is still invalid because of
the coerced party’s inability to freely decide that for herself.134 Abusive ceaseand-desist letters sent to small businesses and individuals are clearly coercive
because the goal of an abusive letter is to cloud the free will and thought
process of the low-resourced recipient. The use of unnecessary legalese and
unsubstantiated statutory citations are intended to confuse and intimidate
the non-attorney recipient of the letter. Additionally, the demand for
immediate settlement within an unreasonable timeframe implies that no
outside advisors would be allowed to provide support to the low-resourced
entity.
Further, the demands provided in the letter approximate extortion.135
The threat of litigation, combined with one of the other indicia of
abusiveness,136 provides the low-resourced entity with a choice of either
complying or facing expensive litigation. This choice may come down to the
decision between staying in business or the value received by keeping a secret
132. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717, 718 n.1
(2005); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 61617
(1943).
133. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 8 (1987) (“[C]oercion compromises or negates the
voluntariness of an act . . . .”); Hale, supra note 132, at 616 (“[W]here there exist coercion . . . there
is no volition. There is no intention nor purpose, but to yield to moral pressure, for relief from it.”).
134. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 601
(1944).
135. See David B. Parker & David D. Yang, Pre-Litigation Demand Letters: Assessing the Thin Line
Between Zealous Advocacy and Extortion, 32 L.A. CNTY. BAR ASSOC. UPDATE, Dec. 2012,
http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid=14413; Max Kennerly, When Does a Lawyer’s Demand
Letter
Become
Extortion?,
LITIGATION
&
TRIAL
(July
19,
2013),
http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2013/07/articles/attorney/demand-letter-extortion/.
136. See supra Parts I.B.14.
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safe. These options are not valid because the damage that could ensue from
the expensive litigation is much greater than the perceived value of settling.
Some critics may argue that a low-resourced target should simply enter
into the coerced agreement and then subsequently bring a lawsuit to
invalidate that agreement based on the coercion, such as in the seminal cases
Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.137 and Alaska Packers’
Ass’n v. Domenico.138 For example, in Totem Marine, the plaintiff had previously
entered into a settlement agreement with Alyeska Pipeline in order to avoid
bankruptcy. After it was able to financially stabilize itself, it brought a lawsuit
against Alyeska Pipeline to invalidate the earlier agreement. However, this is
not a viable option for many low-resourced entities. The inability of small
businesses and individuals to follow through on litigation means that this
population does not have the resources needed to defend or prosecute a civil
lawsuit, and such legal action is needed in order to invalidate coerced
settlement agreements. This inability results in a form of de facto
enforceability, which should be viewed as morally and legally undesirable.
2. Anti-Competitiveness
Economically, abusive cease-and-desist letters sent to small businesses
and individuals are anti-competitive and harms consumer choice. In the
marketplace, it is often the small businesses and individuals who provide
competition to the established businesses in any particular industry, often by
offering cheaper or cutting-edge alternatives. For example, a dog toy
company, Haute Diggity Dog, made chewable dog toys called “Chewy
Vuiton,” that cost approximately $10, whereas the trademark holder, Louis
Vuitton, sold dog accessories costing approximately $1,600.139 Additionally,
individual bloggers that write product reviews or commentary aid small

137. 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978). In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., the plaintiff previously agreed to a
settlement in return for a severe reduction in payment that was owed under the prior contract. Id.
at 18. The plaintiff agreed to the settlement because they needed the quick infusion of cash, or else
they would have gone bankrupt. Id. The court ruled that the settlement agreement had been
coerced under the doctrine of economic duress and invalidated the agreement, paving the way for
the plaintiff to potentially recover the full amount owed under the prior contract. Id. at 2325.
138. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). Interestingly, the court in Alaska Packers’ Ass’n did not base its
holding on the doctrine of coercion, but rather on the pre-existing duty rule. Id. at 103. However,
the case has been re-explained by Professor Finkelstein in terms of coercion. See Finkelstein, supra
note 131, at 4248.
139. See Peter Lattman, “Chewy Vuiton” Beats Louis Vuitton, But Feels a Bite, WALL ST. J. LAW
BLOG (Nov. 28, 2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/11/28/chewy-vuiton-beats-louis-vuittonbut-feels-a-bite/; Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 268 (4th
Cir. 2007).
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businesses in increasing exposure and further facilitate marketplace
competition.140 Cheaper, or different, products, and candid reviews are
helpful to consumers, as they provide increased choice and information.
The effectiveness of abusive cease-and-desist letters results in a
reduction in competition, particularly where the letter alleges a violation of
intellectual property rights. Patents, copyrights, and trademarks are often
embedded within a product or service. Where the abusive cease-and-desist
letter requires a complete abstention of future production or sales of a
product or service or alternatively pay an outrageous license fee, a lowresourced entity may choose to simply discontinue the product. For example,
the previously mentioned Haute Diggity Dog’s entire line of dog toys were
parodies of famous trademarks. When Louis Vuitton sued them for
trademark infringement, the small business defended itself because,
otherwise, in the words of one employee, “we would have had to go out of
business.”141 Unfortunately, even though practitioners acknowledge this anticompetitive aspect of intellectual property enforcement, it is often not
actionable or successful under antitrust law.142
3. Private Censorship143
A more general concern is the effect that abusive cease-and-desist letters
have on the freedom of low-resourced entities to express themselves. One
example involves the blog, kevynorr.com, which criticized the actions taken
by Kevyn Orr, a former partner at the large law firm, Jones Day, in handling

140. Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK
LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 40910 (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
141. Lattman, supra note 139 (quoting a Haute Diggity Dog employee).
142. Grinvald, supra note 15, at 650 (stating that trademark bullying will not fall within the
purview of antitrust law because a trademark is unlikely to generate market power, which is a main
requirement for an antitrust cause of action). See also Michael Lipkin, Lens.com’s Antitrust Suit Against
1-800 Contacts Dismissed, LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/514963/lenscom-s-antitrust-suit-against-1-800-contacts-dismissed (“U.S. District Judge David Sam dismissed
Lens.com’s suit with prejudice, following the Tenth Circuit’s decision last year in a related case that
1-800 Contacts’ trademark claims were not baseless.”).
143. While private censorship is not inherently unconstitutional due to the lack of state action,
it is problematic in its own right. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 44449 (1990) (discussing the public versus private
action distinction). Intellectual property law’s harmful effect on free speech has been the topic of
extensive academic discussion and the full range of arguments is outside the scope of this Article.
For more in-depth coverage see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70
TENN. L. REV. 1095, 116264 (2003); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 49 (2008); Ridgway, supra note 19, at 157178.
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Detroit’s bankruptcy restructuring.144 The law firm sent the blog an abusive
cease-and-desist letter with the intent to stop the negative criticism.145 Such
criticism, while perhaps hurtful to Jones Day, serves an important function
in our democratic society. Had the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit organization, not stepped in to provide free legal counsel to the blog
owners, it is likely that the criticism would have been taken down.146 More
common, however, is for the low-resourced target to simply end its speech or
censor itself ex ante. This results in an implicit authorization of private
censorship, and where the targets are small businesses and individuals,
regulation is clearly needed.

III. Regulation of Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters?
Although cease-and-desist letters are typically private, there are a
number of regulations or statutes that could serve to police abusive letters.
These include legal ethics rules, judicial protections against abusive litigants,
state anti-patent troll legislation, and consumer protection laws.

A. Legal Ethics Rules
All attorneys have a unique responsibility to maintain the integrity and
competence of the legal profession147 and are subject to the particular ethical
rules established by the state where they are barred.148 Almost all states
implement rules that closely resemble the American Bar Association’s (ABA)
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,149 thus analyzing the applicability of

144. Joe Patrice, Biglaw Firm Throws Even Bigger Hissy Fit, ABOVE THE LAW (June 20, 2014),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/06/biglaw-firm-throws-even-bigger-hissy-fit/.
145. Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, supra note 57; see also Daniel Nazer, EFF to Jones Day:
Don’t be a Trademark Bully, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 24, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/eff-jones-day-dont-be-trademark-bully.
146. The blogger may have been coerced into taking down the site, as the cease-and-desist
letter is very abusive. For example, it concludes with an ominous line, “Your conduct will be closely
monitored.” Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, supra note 57. The letter was also sent to the domain
registrar and hosting service, GoDaddy.com. Id. Although GoDaddy.com has no legal obligation
to take down the domain name, Jones Day may have hoped that GoDaddy.com believed it needed
to take down the website to comply with the safe harbor for internet service providers under section
230 of the Communications Decency Act. See Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications
Decency Act, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/immunity-onlinepublishers-under-communications-decency-act (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
147. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (2013).
148. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD 41 (2d ed. 1998).
149. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N,
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the Model Rules to policing cease-and-desist letters adequately reflects state
ethics rules. These rules govern all aspects of an attorney’s professional
conduct, covering behavior in interacting with a client, with the court, as well
as with non-client parties. If a lawyer sends a cease-and-desist letter, Model
Rules 3.1 and 4.4 should be implicated because both rules involve attorney
interactions with a non-client.150 However, even if attorneys followed both
rules, concerning ambiguities and gaps in regulation still exist.
1. Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4 Are Insufficient Policing Mechanisms
a. Model Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claim and Contentions

Model Rule 3.1 states, “A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding,
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”151 This rule could be
interpreted to regulate cease-and-desist letters that contain extremely weak
or meritless claims. If all attorneys adhered to this rule there would never be
frivolous claims or lawsuits, but in reality, there is a widespread
understanding that the rules of professional conduct do not effectively
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_p
rofessional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). For
the Model Rules themselves, see Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Table of Contents, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_p
rofessional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015).
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2013); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 4.4 (2013). There are a number of other Model Rules that could potentially also
govern an attorney’s conduct in sending a cease-and-desist letter. For example, Paragraph 9 of the
Preamble, Model Rule 3.4 titled Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel, and Model Rule 4.1
titled Truthfulness in Statements to Others. Paragraph 9 of the Preamble includes in a lawyer’s
responsibility the duty to zealously represent one’s client but also maintain “a professional,
courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble, ¶ 9 (2013). However, an in-depth discussion of all of the Model Rules
(including the Preamble) is outside the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article will briefly analyze
Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4, highlight the main problems with each rule, and discuss the shortcomings
with attorney ethical rules overall as an effective policing mechanism for abusive cease-and-desist
letters.
Some states, like California, have additional rules that implicate communications between attorneys
and non-clients. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5-100(a) (2013) (prohibiting California
attorneys from threatening criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage
in a civil dispute). Although Rule 5-100 applies to pre-litigation behavior, the rule does not cover
abusive cease-and-desist letters that threaten civil litigation proceedings, as the rule only prohibits
“criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges.” Id.
151. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2013).
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prevent attorneys from bringing meritless claims.152 Due to this, there are a
number of other mechanisms that attempt to regulate attorney and litigant
behavior, such as various provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
including Rule 11, which penalizes attorneys and litigants for bringing
frivolous lawsuits.153 Additionally, Model Rule 3.1 does not prohibit sending
an abusive cease-and-desist letter if it contains some legally meritorious
claims.154 As such, there are other concerns with abusive cease-and-desist
letters, for example, utilizing unnecessary legalese or demanding a settlement
within a short timeframe, which the Model Rules do not address.
b. Model Rule 4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons

The title of Model Rule 4.4, “Respect For Rights Of Third Persons,”155
would seem to closely address the concern of preventing abusive cease-anddesist letters. The text of Model Rule 4.4(a) states, “In representing a client,
a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining
evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.”156 However, the
problem with abusive letters is that their substantial purpose is to stop the
infringing actions through coercion, with the threats of embarrassment as a
means to obtain the desired settlement. Furthermore, two of the three
comments to Model Rule 4.4 appear to focus the rule on the gathering of
evidence;157 therefore, the meaning of the term “burden” could be
interpreted as meaning burdensome discovery requests, rather than sending
abusive letters.
2. Additional Concerns: Partisanship, Enforcement and
Coverage
Notwithstanding the identified gaps in each of the Model Rules, even if
the rules could theoretically prevent almost all instances of abusive letters
sent by attorneys, there are at least three additional concerns that prevent
the Model Rules from being entirely effective: partisanship, enforcement,
and coverage.
152. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation,
89 IND. L.J. 1191 (2014) (discussing multiple instances where attorneys filed meritless claims).
153. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See also infra Part III.B.2.
154. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2013).
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 (2013).
156. Id.
157. Id. r. 4.4 cmts. 23.
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a. Partisanship

The first concern is with an attorney’s ability to identify violations of the
ethical rules. Professor Andrew Perlman’s recent article on “partisanship,”
or the assumption that lawyers are capable of being affiliated with one side
of the matter while remaining sufficiently objective about their own conduct,
persuasively shows that an attorney’s objective self-analysis as to whether she
is following the ethical rules is distorted.158 For example, where an attorney
discovers documents that would be extremely detrimental to her client’s case,
that attorney may not disclose those documents and further, may not believe
she has crossed the ethical line. Professor Perlman’s article suggests that
attorneys may believe that they are following the rules, but in fact are not,
due to a lack of objectivity.159 In the above example, the attorney may believe
that she is acting as a “zealous” and ethical advocate due to her lack of
objectivity. The concern with partisanship is that attorney ethical rules are
mostly enforced through self-regulation. This means attorneys themselves
are in charge of deciding when they are following the rules and will have a
difficult time determining whether they are complying in situations where
the legal standard (e.g., the meaning of a “meritless” cease-and-desist letter)
is unclear. Additionally, attorneys have a duty to report ethical infractions of
other attorneys.160 The threat of being reported is assumed to have a
deterrent effect and limit unethical practices.161 But Professor Perlman’s
article casts serious doubt on this assumption, as unethical conduct is likely
to go undetected.162
b. Enforcement

The second concern is enforcement of the rules because enforcement is

158. See Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 3).
159. Id.
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (2013) (“A lawyer who knows that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate professional authority.”).
161. See generally Christine E. Parker, Robert Eli Rosen & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, The Two
Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
201 (2009) (conducting empirical study into the ethical and legal compliance of lawyers and their
clients).
162. See Perlman, supra note 158, at 1622 (providing examples of studies showing that biases
tend to cloud attorney’s recognition of unethical conduct).
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primarily through self-regulation.163 The implications of partisanship are that
another attorney receiving an abusive cease-and-desist letter may not
recognize the letter as abusive.164 Notwithstanding partisanship, due to the
characteristics of small businesses and individuals, it is unlikely that this
population would have access to legal resources to assist them in identifying
abusive behavior. Additionally, even where abusive behavior is identified by
low-resourced entities, knowledge of how and where to report attorney
conduct is confusing. State bar associations do conduct a certain amount of
outreach education to local communities about attorney ethical behavior and
attempt to ease the burden of reporting by maintaining online reporting
systems.165 However, additional assistance is needed.
c. Coverage

Finally, another concern of relying solely on the Model Rules to police
abusive cease-and-desist letters is that they do not cover letters sent by nonattorneys. Although attorneys send the majority of cease-and-desist letters on
behalf of their clients, there are certain instances when non-attorneys send
letters. For example, the Chairman of Eastern Point Trust Company, a nondepository trust company, sent a cease-and-desist letter to Mr. Money
Mustache, a financial advice blogger, alleging tortious business interference,
conversion, trade disparagement, defamation, trademark, and copyright
violations made by a post on its website.166 The contents of the letter are
abusive because it threatens to pursue litigation with an extremely weak legal
claim if the demands are not met within five days.167 The Model Rules would
163. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 10 (2013).
164. See Perlman, supra note 158, at 3132 (discussing the issue of “ethical fading,” which are
blind spots, particularly in light of the structures of modern law firms).
165. See, e.g., Lawyer Regulation, CAL. STATE BAR, http://calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys
/LawyerRegulation.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2015); Resolving Conflict With a New York Attorney: A Guide
to Attorney Disciplinary Procedures in New York State, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.nysba.org
/CustomTemplates/SecondaryStandard.aspx?id=26561 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015); Client-Attorney
Assistance Program (CAAP), TEX. STATE BAR, http://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu
/ForThePublic/ProblemswithanAttorney/CAAP/default.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2015); File a
Complaint Against a Lawyer, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-andLawyer-Conduct/Discipline/File-a-Complaint-Against-a-Lawyer (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
166. Letter from Glen Armand, Chairman, Eastern Point Trust Co., to
MrMoneyMustache.com (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.mrmoneymustache.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/kisstrust_first_bullshit_letter.jpg.
167. Id.; see also Tim Cushing, Company Fires Off Legal Threats To Site Owner Over Third-Party Forum
Post; Self-Inflicted Damage Ensues, TECHDIRT (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.techdirt.com/articles
/20140313/07405826562/company-fires-off-legal-threats-to-site-owner-over-third-party-forumpost-self-inflicted-damage-ensues.shtml (discussing the tenuousness of the letter’s claims).
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not cover this letter because the Chairman is not a licensed attorney.168
Additionally, it is popular for large intellectual property rights holders to have
brand managers, typically non-attorneys, manage the enforcement of their
trademark portfolio.169 While brand managers may work in concert with an
attorney to draft a standard cease-and-desist letter, a non-attorney brand
manager is not bound by any ethical rules. Thus, even if Model Rules 3.1
and 4.4 were effective in policing abusive cease-and-desist letters sent by
attorneys, these rules would not cover all abusive letters.

B. Judicial Protection Against Abusive Litigants
The sender of an abusive cease-and-desist letter is similar to an abusive
litigant in that the sender is attempting to utilize the legal system to coerce
the target into yielding to its demands. As such, two forms of protection
against abusive litigants, the potential for declaratory judgment actions and
sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, could apply to
situations of abusive cease-and-desist letters.
1. Declaratory Judgment Actions
A declaratory judgment action allows the recipient of a cease-and-desist
letter to file a lawsuit against the sender seeking to resolve any legal
uncertainty.170 This allows targets to potentially resolve the controversy
raised by cease-and-desist letters faster because they do not have to wait to
see whether or not the sender brings the threatened lawsuit.171 Depending
on the type of legal violation stated in the cease-and-desist letter, this
procedure is a valuable way to “clear the air” and move forward with one’s

168. See Cushing, supra note 167 (reporting that Glen Armand is not an attorney).
169. Leah Chan Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect for Small Businesses, 95 MARQ. L. REV.
1491, 1529 (2012).
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . .
any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”).
171. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 43, 45 (2010) (stating that declaratory relief in patent cases are effective because
the alleged infringer chooses the forum and controls the timing of suit). See also R. Scott Weide,
Patent Enforcement Deterrence: Liberal Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 65
UMKC L. REV. 177, 177 (1996) (“In many instances, the filing of a declaratory judgment action
gives the alleged infringer a significant strategic advantage over the patent owner.”); Homer Yanghsien Hsu, Neutralizing Actual Controversy: How Patent Holders Can Reduce the Risk of Declaratory Judgment
in Patent Disputes, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 93, 96 (2010) (“The advantages of declaratory
judgments for alleged patent infringers are many.”).
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business or life.172 Due to this ability, as well as the central role intellectual
property plays in some businesses’ products, declaratory judgment actions
are frequently sought in patent disputes.173
However, the problem with declaratory judgment actions is that it is still
a judicial procedure that comes with the commensurate time and expense of
litigation.174 This means that the characteristics of small businesses and
individuals will continue to hinder this group of disputants with an inability
to follow through with litigation, and it is unlikely that this population would
be able to bring a declaratory judgment action. Unlike in a regular lawsuit
where a plaintiff may be able to find a contingency-fee attorney, it is unlikely
that a plaintiff’s attorney firm would be willing to take a target’s declaratory
judgment case because the target is the one that is claimed to be in the wrong.
Further, even if a small business or individual has business insurance that
covers defending an action, the insurance policy would likely require the
small business or individual to wait until the plaintiff initiates a legal action
in order to pay for the defense.175
172. See Chester S. Chuang, Unjust Patents & Bargaining Breakdown: When is Declaratory Relief
Needed?, 64 SMU L. REV. 895, 899900 (2011) (noting importance of declaratory relief to potential
infringers because of substantial damage awards); Tejas N. Narechania, An Offensive Weapon?: An
Empirical Analysis of the “Sword” of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1574, 1590 (2010) (“[D]eclaratory judgment actions serve an important role in the intellectual
property system . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted); Marta R. Vanegas, You Infringed My Patent, Now
Wait Until I Sue You: The Federal Circuit’s Decision in Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International
Co., 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 384 (2010) (“Congress enacted the Declaratory
Judgment Act to eliminate uncertainty in situations where one of the parties threatens to sue but
does not proceed. . . . Congress was especially mindful of the problems presented in patent,
trademark, and copyright infringement cases.”).
173. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1464 (2010) (stating that in all
jurisdictions outside of the Eastern District of Texas declaratory judgments accounted for 15.49%
of patent suits filed in 2005). See also Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 921 (2001) (stating that declaratory judgments brought
by the infringer accounted for 14% of all tried cases in the dataset). Additionally Professor Megan
La Belle’s research in the area shows a close link between the Declaratory Judgment Act and patent
litigation. Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 6061 (2012).
174. See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory
Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn’t
Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 53132 (1989) (“A declaratory judgment action is designed to
permit a party to obtain an ‘authoritative judicial statement of the legal relationships,’ regardless of
whether a coercive legal or equitable remedy is sought.”) (quoting Frank M. Gilliland, Jr., Note,
Federal Question Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 4 VAND. L. REV. 827, 830
(1951)).
175. Eliot M. Harris, The Duty to Defend: What Insurers, Insureds and Their Counsel Need to Know
When Faced with a Liability Coverage Dispute, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org
/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/duty.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2015). Most business insurance policies contain a “duty to defend,” which protects the insurance
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2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
A number of Rules of Civil Procedure at both the state and federal level
could potentially regulate abusive cease-and-desist letters.176 For example,
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intends to prevent attorneys
and their clients from bringing frivolous lawsuits.177 Where there is a
violation of Rule 11, either the court or a litigant may bring a motion to
sanction another litigant or their attorney.178 However, the problem with
relying on Rules of Civil Procedure to police abusive cease-and-desist letters
is that courts cannot impose sanctions until the litigation reaches the judicial
system. For example, Rule 11 only authorizes sanctions against attorneys or
their clients for representations made in court filings.179 As mentioned earlier,
the cease-and-desist letter process is mainly extra-judicial, and therefore, a
judge would never be involved to sanction the sender of an abusive ceaseand-desist letter. Additionally, even where litigation arises based on an
abusive cease-and-desist letter, it is likely that an abusive letter would still not
be subjected to regulation by Rule 11, as it is not a court filing, but rather a
private communication between the parties sent prior to litigation.180

C. State Anti-Patent Troll Legislation
The problems concerning abusive cease-and-desist letters and abusive
litigation in the patent area received national attention a few years ago with
the increase in what has been termed as “patent troll” litigation.181 The term
“patent troll” refers to the practice of some business entities of purchasing
patents without the intention of practicing the invention contained within the
policyholder in cases where a lawsuit is filed against her, not the other way around. Id.
176. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 2015); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 22, § 130-1.1 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.160 (West 2015).
177. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
178. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). However, only attorneys can be sanctioned for violations of Rule
11(b)(2), which requires an attorney certifies that the “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A).
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
180. See id. Sometimes abusive cease-and-desist letters are entered into evidence in a civil
litigation, but oftentimes it is simply to buttress a claim of notice or to fight against personal
jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action. See Athletic Training Innovations, LLC v. L.A. Gear,
Inc., No. 10-1524, 2010 WL 4103309, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2010) (holding that an abusive ceaseand-desist letter, when sent to plaintiff and its customers, supports a finding of personal jurisdiction
over defendant). Additionally, even where senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters are subject to
judicial scrutiny, the likelihood of a judge issuing sanctions is fairly slim. Manta, supra note 7, at 860.
181. See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 32728 (2012).
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patent (also referred to as non-practicing entities or patent assertion
entities).182 Instead, the reason for purchasing the patent is to simply enforce
its rights against unauthorized users to extract licensing fees.183 Although
patent law implicitly authorizes entities having no intention to practice the
invention to acquire patents, this form of patent enforcement became
problematic when patent trolls began filing multiple lawsuits against targets,
clogging up the court dockets.184 However, it was not until patent trolls began
to target small businesses and individuals that the problem reached executive
and legislative attention.185
A number of different bills were introduced in Congress to combat the
problem of patent trolls, but all have been stalled.186 In response to the
congressional inaction, a wave of “anti-patent troll” legislation began to take
hold at the state level in 2013. As of the date of this Article, there are
approximately twenty-two states with this type of legislation.187 Each state’s
legislation differs slightly, but at the core of each statute is a prohibition on
182. Id.; see also Colleen Chien, Presentation to the DOJ/FTC Hearing of PAEs: Patent
Assertion
Entities
(Dec.
10,
2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314. Not all non-practicing entities (NPEs) purchase their patent
portfolio. Some NPEs, like universities, have organic patent portfolios from their research
departments. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 611, 61214 (2008) (answering the title’s question in the negative, and terming
universities as non-practicing entities).
183. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 2117, 212627 (2013) (describing these entities as “patent aggregators”).
184. See Chien, supra note 182 (finding that in 2012, patent assertion entities filed 61% of all
patent infringement lawsuits).
185. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that small businesses are frequent
targets of patent troll demand letters); Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 461, 46465 (2014) (finding that 40% of small businesses had been targets of patent troll ceaseand-desist letters for using technology provided by another party); Catching Up on . . . Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC’s Litigation Activities, ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://essentialpatentblog.com/2013/01/catching-up-on-innovation-ip-ventures-llcs-litigationactivities/ (reporting on Innovatio’s use of Broadcom’s patents to sue businesses such as restaurants,
coffee shops, hotels, and grocery stores that use wireless internet).
186. See Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS,
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patentreform-legislation/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2015); Joe Mullin, Anti-Patent-Troll Bill Stalls in Senate, But
Reformers Remain Hopeful, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2104), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2014/04/anti-patent-troll-bill-stalls-in-senate-but-reformers-remain-hopeful/. However,
none of the bills attempt to address letters sent by patent trolls, just litigation behavior. See, e.g.,
Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 299A (2015) (proposing to add a new section to the Patent
Act, 35 U.S.C. § 299A, that recognizes the abusiveness of demand letters, but does not sanction the
letters themselves rather the litigation stemming from such letters).
187. See Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, supra note 21 (providing an interactive
map of states with different stages of anti-patent troll bills).
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sending a bad faith assertion of patent infringement through cease-and-desist
letters.188 Determining a “bad faith assertion” is factor-based, and each
statute contains similar factors, such as lack of disclosure of the patent in the
letter (or failure to provide the information once requested), and demands
for payment.189 While these statutes are a step in the right direction, their
applicability is limited to bad faith claims of patent infringement. Therefore,
state laws only provide limited coverage, and would not prohibit abusive
cease-and-desist letters containing claims of other types of violations.
Additionally, the text of the statutes contains limitations.190 For example,
some statutes, like those in Wisconsin, focus on the disclosures contained in
the cease-and-desist letter, rather than on the abusiveness of the demands.191
This means that savvy senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters can easily
escape any legal consequences by complying with the statute’s disclosure
provisions.

D. Consumer Protection Law
A final potential source of regulation for abusive cease-and-desist letters
is federal and state consumer protection law because sending abusive ceaseand-desist letters can constitute an unfair and/or deceptive trade practice. At
the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the authority
under the Federal Trade Commission Act to bring enforcement actions
against entities conducting unfair and/or deceptive trade practices.192 At the
state level, each state attorneys general office enforces the state’s version of

188. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-1703 (West 2014). The state statutes refer to the ceaseand-desist letter as a “demand” letter. Some of the statutes provide a definition of a “demand” letter
to include a “letter, email or other communication asserting or claiming that the target has engaged
in patent infringement.” See, e.g., id. § 48-1702.
189. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1903 (West 2014). In addition, many states include
discretion for the court to consider other factors when determining the bad faith nature of the patent
infringement claim. See id. But see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2014) (“A patent notification
shall contain all of the following . . . . If a patent notification lacks any of the information required . . .
the target may notify the person who made the patent notification that the patent notification is
incomplete.”) (emphasis added).
190. A systemic review of the state laws are beyond the scope of this Article. For coverage of
all forms of patent reforms, see ANDREW S. BALUCH, PATENT REFORM 2014: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO CURRENT PATENT REFORM DEVELOPMENTS IN CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH, THE COURTS AND THE STATES (Mar. 24, 2014), available at
http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/4969911f-42ea-4566-90c9-3fa620d12f91/Presentation
/PublicationAttachment/6ec9626b-2190-4a11-9d51-425adec351f0/PatentReform2014.pdf.
191. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2014).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).

GRINVALD_FINALFORPRINT_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE)

Issue 3]

POLICING THE CEASE-AND-DESIST LETTER

8/25/2015 1:06 PM

445

the “unfair and deceptive practices” act.193 Some abusive cease-and-desist
letters come under the ambit of consumer protection laws, particularly where
they contain deceptive statements or false threats of litigation.194 In fact,
recent enforcement actions taken by the FTC and the Attorneys General of
New York, Nebraska, and Vermont, against the “scanner troll,”195 MPHJ
Technology Investments, LLC, shows the ability of consumer protection laws
to regulate the senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters.196
However, a severe limitation of utilizing consumer protection laws as
the sole means to police abusive cease-and-desist letters is that few letters will
meet the criteria for enforcement efforts by the FTC or a state attorney
general. The reason the FTC and a state attorney general could take action
against MPHJ Technology was because of the extreme number of small
businesses it threatened, and the deceptiveness it used in attempting to coerce
license fees.197 But other well-known patent trolls, such as Innovatio, have
escaped similar FTC and state attorneys general enforcement actions despite
undertaking actions similar to MPHJ Technology, but not in the same
deceptive manner.198 Therefore, where senders of abusive cease-and-desist
letters sufficiently disclose their claims and do not target thousands of small

193. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE
REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 6 (Feb. 2009), available at
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf.
194. Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n on Discussion Draft of Patent Demand Letter Legislation
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce 34 (May 22,
2014) (statement of Lois Greisman, Assoc. Dir. Div. Mktg. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n)
[hereinafter Statement of Lois Greisman].
195. See Samuels, supra note 38 (describing MPHJ technology as the “scanner troll”).
196. See Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Investments, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-170, 2014 WL 1494009
(D. Vt. Apr. 15, 2014); MPHJ Tech. Investments, LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 6:14-cv-11,
2014 WL 189831 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2014) (initiating a lawsuit against FTC for its investigations
of MPHJ); Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13CV215, 2014 WL 197808 (D.
Neb. Jan. 14, 2014); N.Y. Press Release, supra note 13.
197. MPHJ utilized a dizzying array of shell companies to represent itself, leaving the target
unable to speak to a person about the claims contained in the abusive letters. See MPHJ Tech.
Investments, LLC, 2014 WL 1494009, at *12 (describing the process by which MPHJ operated).
198. Innovatio, or the “wifi patent troll,” sent numerous abusive cease-and-desist letters to
small businesses for infringement of its wifi patents. Daniel Nazer, Infamous Wi-Fi Patent Troll Settles
for Peanuts, TROLLING EFFECTS (Feb. 7, 2014), https://trollingeffects.org/blog/infamous-wi-fipatent-troll-settles-peanuts. Attempting to protect its customers, Cisco and a number of other
equipment manufacturers brought an action against Innovatio alleging RICO (fraud and
racketeering) conspiracy. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, Patent Litig., No. 1:11-cv-09308, 2012
WL 8500139, ¶ 1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2012). Cisco’s RICO claims were dismissed and it eventually
settled with Innovatio for 3.2 cents per user. See Thomas F. Cotter, Judge Holderman’s RAND Ruling
in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Oct. 3,
2013),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/10/judge-holdermans-randruling-in-in-re.html.
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businesses in any one particular state, the senders will likely escape legal
liability.
In conclusion, there does not appear to be any one regulatory
mechanism that fits the concerns posed by abusive cease-and-desist letters.
The Model Rules potentially come the closest, but gaps in protection still
exist within the rules, and they also do not cover all senders of abusive ceaseand-desist letters. Additionally, without a serious threat of enforcement, the
rules themselves cannot be effective. Moreover, although the recently
enacted state anti-patent troll laws are a step in the right direction, they are
too narrow in scope as they specifically attempt to cover abusive patent ceaseand-desist letters. Further, actions taken by the FTC and state attorneys
general against MPHJ Technology under consumer protection laws are
another potential avenue for regulation, but currently the actions appear to
be limited to extreme situations where the sender conducts a deceptive and
widespread enforcement campaign. Finally, a more theoretical concern with
each of the various forms of potential regulation is that they do not address
any of the characteristics of small businesses and individuals that contribute
to the coercive settlement process. Therefore, mechanisms need to be
implemented that could better assist with policing abusive cease-and-desist
letters that specifically target the characteristics of this vulnerable population.

IV. Proposals to Police Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters
This Article’s proposals attempt to attack the problem of abusive ceaseand-desist letters from both sides of the dispute, sender and target, with the
goal of creating a non-coercive settlement environment for small businesses
and individuals. First, on the sender side, the proposals attempt to reduce the
incidences of abusive cease-and-desist letters by altering the incentives that
create an environment ripe for abusive letters. Second, on the target side, the
proposals aim to provide mechanisms that assist small businesses and
individuals in overcoming the characteristics that leads to a coercive
settlement process in asymmetrical disputes. While none of the proposals
individually are a panacea for the problems of abusive cease-and-desist
letters, they are an important first step in encouraging the serious and noncoercive enforcement of legal rights.

A. Legislative Action
The first proposal is for Congress and/or states to provide a new cause
of action for “abusive threats” similar in nature to the previously discussed
state anti-patent troll laws, as well as borrowing some procedural advantages
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from state anti-SLAPP laws.199 Before discussing the elements of this new
cause of action, it is important to note the objectives of this proposal and its
limitations. The objectives of this proposal are to reduce the incidences of
abusive cease-and-desist letters and assist small businesses and individuals.
The goal is not to hamper good faith efforts to enforce valid legal rights, but
rather, to provide a non-coercive and more equalized platform for parties of
all sizes to enforce their rights and negotiate a fair settlement. Providing a
new cause of action for abusive threats would accomplish this goal in two
ways.
First, the cause of action attacks the incentives that rights holders have
to send abusive cease-and-desist letters. As discussed in Part II, the major
incentives for sending abusive cease-and-desist letters include a lack of legal
consequences for the action, and the letter’s effectiveness in obtaining the
desired outcome. Without any real possibility of legal consequences, rights
holders are incentivized to send abusive letters because they are low in cost.
It is more rational for a sender to first send an abusive cease-and-desist letter,
and then subsequently analyze whether actually pursuing litigation would be
advantageous. Implementing a cause of action for abusive threats that carries
serious financial risks for the sender of an abusive letter creates the possibility
for greater accountability and would likely result in rights holders
recalibrating their enforcement tactics.
Second, the anti-abusive threats law would attack two of the three
characteristics that cripple small businesses and individuals in an abusive
cease-and-desist letter process: the inability to information-gather and
susceptibility to inducement. This would be done by providing small
businesses and individuals the ability to recover damages, attorneys’ fees, and
legal costs. These remedies would allow small businesses or individuals to
more easily retain attorneys on a contingency fee basis.200 With an ability to
retain an attorney, a low-resourced target of an abusive letter would be able
to information-gather because the attorney would advise the small business
or individual on the strength of the claims contained within the letter, as well
as the target’s relative rights. While an attorney may still advise the lowresourced target that a settlement is preferable,201 the decision would be
199. See supra Part III.C. See generally Curtin, supra note 96.
200. Contingency fee arrangements assist low-resourced entities in obtaining legal
representation. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 243 (1998).
201. For example, when Matt Nadau of RockArt Brewery (a small brewery in Vermont) faced
a potential legal battle with Hansen Beverages, his lawyer explained the risks of fighting back against
a large corporation and ultimately advised him to settle. See Matt vs. The Monster—2011 Bronze Telly,
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informed, rather than one made through coercion. Additionally, an attorney
could curb some of the emotional inducement frequently experienced by
low-resourced targets through counseling and education.
However, this cause of action would not be a panacea to the problems
associated with the abusive cease-and-desist letter. For example, the new law
would not attack the systemic problem of expensive litigation. Similarly, the
new law would not cover the general over-enforcement of legal rights by
Americans and, in particular, by U.S. intellectual property rights holders.202
Instead, this new law will provide modest and incremental assistance to lowresourced targets.
Although this Article does not suggest specific language for the proposed
cause of action, it does take the position that developing a cause of action
should be enacted statutorily, rather than solely through the courts. The need
for uniformity and certainty in the law support this position. In recent years,
judges have become more “textualist” with respect to interpreting statutes
and defenses to violations, particularly with respect to federal intellectual
property laws.203 If a cause of action or defense is not explicitly stated within
the statute, textualist judges would likely rule against the claimant.204 Further,
certainty that a court accepts suits brought by targets of abusive cease-anddesist letters would assist in making contingency fee attorneys feel more
comfortable that their client would not face an uphill battle.
This Article broadly envisions three elements to bring an “anti-abusive
threats” cause of action: (1) there is an allegation of a legal rights violation;
(2) that is abusive; (3) made to a specific target. All of these elements would
need to be met within the first cease-and-desist letter sent to the target in
order for the letter to be actionable. This limitation should assist in protecting
good faith enforcers of legal rights who encounter targets that attempt to
provoke abuse.205 However, standing to bring this cause of action should not
GREEN
RIVER
PICTURES,
http://www.grpny.com/index.php/about-us
/awards?videoid=41738861 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
202. Over-enforcement is a problem of private enforcement of legal rights by intellectual
property rights holders, and is the topic of separate research by this Article’s author, along with coauthors Eric Goldman and Deborah Gerhardt.
203. See Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a “Formalist”
Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 927 (2009).
204. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that despite
a compelling policy argument, the court would not recognize the “famous marks doctrine” in
trademark law because it was not explicitly written into federal trademark law).
205. For example, David Thorne, a comedian and author, provokes abusive behavior by
publishing his emails and letters in books and on his website. See generally DAVID THORNE, THE
INTERNET IS A PLAYGROUND: IRREVERENT CORRESPONDENCES OF AN EVIL ONLINE GENIUS
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only be limited to the recipients of the abusive letter, but by any person who
is aggrieved by such a letter.206
1. Allegation of Legal Rights Violation
One of the deficiencies identified in Part III.C with respect to the
recently enacted anti-patent troll legislation was that the laws only dealt with
bad faith claims of patent infringement. However, abusive letters claiming
legal rights violations occur across all areas of the law. For example, a
number of cases in California courts concerning abusive letters deal with the
misuse of company funds and prior sexual conduct.207 Aside from the
political and media attention that “patent trolls” have garnered, there does
not appear to be a reason as to why other types of intellectual property rights
or other legal rights are exempt from the requirement of good-faith
enforcement.208
2. Abusive Letter
Determining abusiveness is challenging, as is seen from the discussions

(2011); 27B/6, http://www.27bslash6.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). Mr. Thorne received a
cease-and-desist letter from Penguin Books Ltd. (the publisher of his first book) for the artwork
displaying a penguin with its finger raised printed on the cover of his second book. See Dennis
Johnson, Penguin is Not Amused, MELVILLE HOUSE (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.mhpbooks.com
/penguin-is-not-amused/. As can be seen from the series of emails and letters, Mr. Thorne is
purposefully provocative. Penguin, 27B/6, http://www.27bslash6.com/covers.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015).
206. This is similar to the United Kingdom’s remedy for groundless threats of infringement
proceedings. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 70(1) (Eng.) (“Where a person . . . threatens another
person with proceedings for any infringement of a patent, a person aggrieved by the threats
(whether or not he is the person to whom the threats are made) may . . . bring proceedings in the
court against the person making the threats.”); Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21(1) (Eng.) (“Where
a person threatens another with proceedings for infringement of a registered trade mark . . . any
person aggrieved may bring proceedings for relief under this section.”); Registered Designs Act,
1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 88, § 26(1) (Eng.) (“Where any person . . . threatens any other person
with proceedings for infringement of the copyright in a registered design, any person aggrieved
thereby may bring an action against him.”); Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §
253(1) (Eng.) (“Where a person threatens another person with proceedings for infringement of
design right, a person aggrieved by the threats may bring an action against him.”).
207. See, e.g., Malin v. Singer, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (involving
allegations of embezzlement); Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 5 (Cal. 2006) (involving allegations of
sexual misconduct).
208. Patent trolls have garnered national attention, whereas other abusers of legal rights have
not, such as copyright trolls and trademark bullies. However, the harms caused by these other types
of abusers are similar in nature to patent trolls. See Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study,
100 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2015).
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surrounding the abusive letters in California referenced above.209 Although
multi-factor tests are often problematic,210 this Article favors a non-exclusive
factor approach in discerning abusiveness to give courts an appropriate
amount of discretion. Additionally, the non-exclusive factor approach allows
for changes in social norms that necessarily inform this type of analysis. The
factors specified in Part I.B are examples of non-exclusive factors that could
be adopted to determine when a cease-and-desist letter is abusive, but other
factors may be relevant, depending on the type of legal claim asserted.211
Finally, only the first communication sent to the target would be examined
for abusiveness. This limitation would safeguard against targets that attempt
to utilize the new cause of action to goad the legal rights holder into sending
an abusive letter. A number of well-resourced individuals enjoy provoking
rights holders to see if they become abusive out of frustration.212
3. Made to a Target
This last element is worded broadly in order to afford many different
types of targets standing to sue an abusive sender. Senders can target a wide
range of different entities other than the alleged violator, such as the alleged
violator’s customers, distribution network, or supply chain.213 At times, it
may be more efficient or economical for a rights holder to threaten the supply
chain or customers of an alleged violator, rather than the actual infringer.214
For example, the patent troll Innovatio, targeted the customers of Cisco and
other router manufacturers with its cease-and-desist letters.215 Although

209. In Malin v. Singer, the California district court found that the attorney (Martin Singer) had
sent an abusive letter, while the appellate court reversed. Malin v. Singer, No. BC466696, 2011
WL 6070271 (Cal. Super. Nov. 29, 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 304 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2013). In Flatley v. Mauro, the California courts held that the attorney’s letter (sent by
Mauro) was abusive and amounted to extortion as a matter of law. Flatley v. Mauro, 18 Cal. Rptr.
3d 472, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 139 P.3d 2, 24 (Cal. 2006). Commentators have been
attempting to reconcile the two holdings. See Kennerly, supra note 135; Parker & Yang, supra note
135.
210. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 161415 (2006).
211. See supra Part I.B (listing inappropriate legalese or other harsh or insulting language,
demands for quick settlement, demands for immediate payment fees, and weak or unreasonable
claims of rights violations as potential factors to determine abusiveness).
212. See supra note 205.
213. See Grinvald, supra note 169, at 152631 (discussing effective enforcement frameworks for
abusive rights holders).
214. See id.
215. See Catching Up on . . . Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC’s Litigation Activities, supra note 185.
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Cisco and other manufacturers brought a declaratory judgment action
against Innovatio on behalf of its customers,216 other entities may not be so
proactive and they will likely need to give into the cease-and-desist letter.
4. Procedural Elements
In addition to the substantive elements, there are a number of
procedural elements that need to be implemented that are crucial to assisting
low-resourced targets. First, the burden of proof of whether the letter is
abusive would be on the letter sender. Second, fast-track status would be
given to such lawsuits filed by abusive letter targets, similar to the special
motions to strike filed under anti-SLAPP laws.217 Finally, if a court found a
letter abusive, it would award damages, attorneys’ fees, and legal costs to the
target. Each of these elements will be discussed in turn.
a. Burden of Proof

An important part of the anti-abusive threats cause of action would be
having the burden on the sender of the letter to prove that the letter is not
abusive.218 One main reason for this requirement is that the party who bears
the burden of proof in civil litigation also bears the costs of producing
evidence needed to resolve the dispute.219 Letter senders, unlike targets, are
in the best practical and economical position to provide evidence to prove
the information contained in the letter, why it chose to send the letter to the
target, and the reasoning behind the letter’s settlement demand costs or
timeframe. Since the sender wrote the letter, it presumably has easy access
to all the evidence needed to satisfy its burden of proof. Thus, it is more costeffective for the sender to bear the burden, and it reduces the costs of bringing

216. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, Patent Litig., No. 1:11-cv-09308, 2012 WL 8500139,
¶ 1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2012); see also Mark Chandler, Innovatio Case: Victory for Cisco Customers Makes the
Case for Patent Reform, CISCO BLOGS (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://blogs.cisco.com/news
/innovatio-case-victory-for-cisco-customers-makes-the-case-for-patent-reform.
217. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West 2015) (requiring the court to schedule
a hearing on an anti-SLAPP motion no more than thirty days after the service of the motion).
218. The burden of proof is an extremely important element of civil litigation, as who bears
the burden oftentimes influences the outcome. Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in
Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (1981) (“[T]he
allocation of the burdens of proof during trial often has a significant effect on the outcome of a case
and frequently may be dispositive.”).
219. Roger B. Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1151, 1153
(1972) (“On each issue in a case some party must carry the burden of producing evidence or lose at
the hands of the judge . . . .”).
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an anti-abusive threats cause of action for the target.220
b. Fast-Track Status

The length of litigation is a major contributor to its high cost. In 2012,
the average hourly billing rate of an attorney employed by a private law firm
in the United States was just under $400.221 The longer a legal dispute runs,
the higher the legal bills. Implementing a “fast-track” status for anti-abusive
threats lawsuits would attempt to alleviate some of the costs associated with
a lengthy court case. The known expense of litigation is one of the elements
contributing to the increasing use of cease-and-desist letters for legal dispute
resolution, and granting fast-track status could make going to the courts more
attractive. Additionally, high litigation cost is a factor that places lowresourced targets in a coercive situation with well-resourced letter senders,
and a knowingly quick judicial resolution would assist in overcoming the
imbalance of power. Fast-track status would require a judge to schedule a
hearing within a short timeframe after the defendant files a response.222 The
notion of a fast-track status is not new: California’s anti-SLAPP law requires
a judge to schedule a hearing on the special motion within thirty days from
service.223 Other commentators have also proposed similar types of
mechanisms to expedite cases involving low-resourced entities, such as
specialized small claims courts.224
c. Damages, Attorneys’ Fees, and Legal Costs

The type of remedies available for a cause of action plays an important
strategic role in determining whether to bring a case.225 Although most causes
220. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective,
26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 41819 (1997) (providing an economic model demonstrating the optimal
allocation of the burdens of proof in civil litigation).
221. See AIPLA 2013 REPORT, supra note 88, at 49.
222. See Steven P. Aggergaard, Three State-Based Defenses to Consider, FOR THE DEFENSE, Apr.
2012, at 16, 18, available at http://www.bassford.com/newsevents-pressrelease-0412-spa.pdf.
223. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West 2015).
224. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Department of Commerce Releases Worthless Report on Trademark Bullying,
TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives
/2011/04/department_of_c.htm. Additionally, Professor Irina Manta has suggested that the
USPTO act in an oversight capacity to assist in these disputes. Manta, supra note 7, at 86671.
Further, the USPTO requested comments as to whether the United States should establish a small
claims proceeding for patent cases. See Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding
in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,830 (Dec. 18, 2012).
225. For example, attorneys routinely strategize dispute resolution options based on the types
of remedies involved. See Davis, supra note 122, at 14 (“[M]ost parties to lawsuits eventually decide
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of action allow a winning plaintiff to recoup damages, recovering attorneys’
fees and legal costs is less typical.226 This is due to the “American rule” that
requires each party in litigation to bear its own costs.227 However, certain
types of litigation need incentives, or must at least be made easier to bring.
Some courts recognize this need and allow for fee-shifting.228 Bringing an
anti-abusive threats action should be encouraged, and implementing fee
shifting provisions is critical because it may convince risk-adverse attorneys
into taking on these cases.
The ability to bring a preemptory action against an abusive letter sender
would assist in altering the incentives and overcoming some of the
characteristics plaguing low-resourced targets. While the proposed antiabusive threats law would not directly attack the problem of the overenforcement of legal rights, with serious legal consequences at stake for overenforcing one’s rights, it is likely that potential abusers would adopt a more
appropriate approach to their legal rights enforcement efforts. However, due
to the limitations of an anti-abusive threats law, additional measures are
needed to fully address the problems facing low-resourced targets.

B. Greater Involvement by Bar Associations
In addition to the proposed anti-abusive threats law, greater
involvement by state bar associations is needed in order to curb the
incidences of abusive cease-and-desist letters. The ABA and state bar
associations are in a good position to assist in this effort because attorneys
write the majority of cease-and-desist letters. As previously discussed, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not explicitly cover the problem of
abusive letters.229 Additionally, even if the rules explicitly prohibited abusive
cease-and-desist letters, concerns with partisanship and the ability to
objectively assess ethical violations would continue to exist.230 Although state
to pursue or to settle their claims based on a cost-benefit analysis.”).
226. However, it is becoming more typical. See Rebecca Friedman, The Lodestar Ranger:
Calculating Attorneys’ Fee Awards in Perdue v. Kenny A., 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR
58, 6263 n.31 (2009) (citing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 913 (3d ed. 2002)) (“More than 180 federal statutes and 4,000 state statutes authorize
awards of attorneys’ fees.”).
227. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) (recognizing
the “American rule”). See also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982).
228. For example, in civil rights litigation this has been termed the “private attorney general”
situation. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d, 488 F.2d 559 (9th
Cir. 1973).
229. See supra Part III.A.
230. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
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bar associations are aware of these problems, there is more that could be
done to encourage and educate attorneys to self-regulate this specific form of
problematic behavior.
First, the ABA or state bar associations could issue formal ethics
opinions stating that the Model Rules prohibit sending abusive cease-anddesist letters. This would help clarify the applicability of the rules to this
practice and hopefully reduce the incidences of attorney-written, abusive
cease-and-desist letters. Second, state and local bar associations should
conduct educational programs for its members on the particular issues that
arise when dealing with low-resourced targets of cease-and-desist letters in
order to help with the problem of partisanship. Finally, local bar associations
should provide enhanced outreach to low-resourced targets to specifically
educate them on how to handle cease-and-desist letters, which could assist in
overcoming their inability to information-gather and in overcoming their
susceptibility to inducement.
1. Formal Ethics Opinion Interpreting Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to Prohibit Abusive Cease-and-Desist
Letters
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and
state bar associations sometimes issue formal ethics opinions interpreting
applicable ethical rules.231 These opinions range in topics, from interpreting
the rules prohibiting sexual relations with clients to those allowing attorneys
to communicate with clients through unencrypted email.232 State bar
associations often address similar topics as the ABA.233 Although these ethics
opinions are not formally binding, they are quite influential.234
As discussed in Part III.A, Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4 do not explicitly

231. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 468 (2014)
(interpreting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.17 (2013)); Cal. State Bar Standing Comm.
on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 12-0007 (2014) (interpreting CAL. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-100, 3-700(B)(2) (2013)).
232. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992) (discussing
sex with clients); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999)
(discussing protecting the confidentiality of unencrypted email).
233. For example, in 2006, the ABA released a Formal Opinion on when “puffing” is
appropriate in negotiations, and the California State Bar Association released a similar formal
opinion in 2014. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006);
Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 12-0007 (2014).
234. See Lawrence K. Hellman, When “Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean What They Say: The Implications
of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 32526 (1996).
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prohibit legal rights enforcement through the use of abusive cease-and-desist
letters. While there are formal ethics opinions that discuss related areas, the
lack of a formal ethics opinion directly on the topic of abusive cease-anddesist letters leaves a gap in regulation. For example, ABA Formal Opinion
94-383, “Use of Threatened Disciplinary Complaint Against Opposing
Counsel,” interprets the Model Rules to prohibit attorneys from threatening
to file disciplinary charges against an opposing counsel in order to coerce
settlements.235 Where an attorney threatens to file a disciplinary charge, but
has no actual intent to do so, this behavior is interpreted to violate Rule 4.1,
which requires a lawyer to be truthful in dealings with others on a client’s
behalf.236 While this formal opinion appears to address the prohibition of
abusive letters generally, it is directed specifically at the use of an unrelated
disciplinary action to coerce settlement. Abusive cease-and-desist letters
contain threats that are related to the legal violation claims alleged in the
letter. A formal ethics opinion that clarified that Model Rules 3.1, 4.4, and
4.1 prohibited attorneys from sending abusive communications to adverse
parties would assist in bringing awareness to this issue.
While attorneys are aware of their ethical obligations to not allege weak
or unreasonable legal rights violations, many are likely unaware of the
additional requirement to be non-abusive.237 Unfortunately, it has become
the norm in the legal profession to include abusive tactics and legalese to
blanket cease-and-desist letters with a posturing air of seriousness or
authority.238 A formal ethics opinion unambiguously stating the “do’s” and
“don’ts” of cease-and-desist letters would clarify that the ethical obligations
require attorneys to be non-coercive in private settlements. While this would
help stem the incidences of abusive letters by changing the norms of the
cease-and-desist letter process, problems associated with partisanship would
still exist because attorneys would still be placed in situations where they are
supposed to be advocating for one side, and therefore may not be objective
judges of ethics.

235. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 (1994).
236. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (2013).
237. However, recognition of an ethical rule does not translate into full compliance. See
Gallagher, supra note 8, at 496.
238. See The Mechanics of Ethical and Effective Cease and Desist Letters, SMITH & HOPEN,
http://www.smithhopen.com/litigation_cease_and_desist_letter_strategies.aspx (last visited Feb.
20, 2015) (categorizing abusive cease-and-desist letters as the “furious demand,” and describing
them as very common in intellectual property litigation).
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2. Member Educational Campaigns
As a complement to issuing a formal ethics opinion, state and local bar
associations should undertake campaigns of their members to educate them
on the myriad of issues associated with abusive cease-and-desist letters. These
issues would include the confluence of factors identified in this Article that
create a coercive settlement process for low-resourced targets. These types of
educational campaigns are not new since some state and local bar
associations already conduct similar types of campaigns, such as those
promoting “civility.”239 For example, the San Diego County Bar Association
(SDCBA) has undertaken a “Campaign on Civility, Integrity, and
Professionalism,” in which it seeks to promote attorney civility inside and
outside of the courtroom.240 To do so, it issued its own “Attorney Code of
Conduct,”241 as well as “Guidelines for Effective and Professional
Advocacy.”242 One of the SDCBA Guidelines states that “[i]n analyzing
ethical dilemmas, do not simply ask yourself if it violates any law; also ask
yourself if it is fair and if it is the right thing to do.”243 While this is an
extremely helpful guideline, it is only useful insofar as attorneys view being
abusive in cease-and-desist letters as an ethical dilemma. As previously
discussed, partisanship aids in blinding attorneys from recognizing their
ethical violations.244 Additional education is needed so attorneys can
recognize ethical violations in the cease-and-desist letter process, which may
include instruction on cognitive distortions.245

239. See, e.g., Journal News, Statewide Civility Initiative Will Encourage Conversations, TENN. BAR
ASS’N (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.tba.org/journal/statewide-civility-initiative-will-encourageconversations; Joseph Paul Justice Burke III, Reap What You Sow: Bar Leaders as Cultivators of Civility,
38 BAR LEADER (Jan.–Feb. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar_leader/201314/january-february/reap_what_you_sow_bar_leaders_as_cultivators_civility.html.
240. SDCBA Campaign on Civility, Integrity, and Professionalism, SAN DIEGO CNTY. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=Civility (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
241. The SDCBA Attorney Code of Conduct, SAN DIEGO CNTY. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=AttyCodeConduct (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
242. San Diego County Bar Association Guidelines for Effective and Professional Advocacy, SAN DIEGO
CNTY. BAR ASS’N, https://www.sdcba.org/SDCBA/docDownload/15452 (last visited Mar. 15,
2015).
243. Id.
244. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
245. See Perlman, supra note 158, at 3738 (suggesting that cognitive bias awareness be
included in legal education).
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3. Outreach to Small Businesses and Individuals
Finally, additional attention by state and local bar associations should
be given to low-resourced targets of abusive cease-and-desist letters for two
different reasons. First, access to legal resources could assist in overcoming
an inability to information-gather, as well as lower the susceptibility to
inducement. While many, if not all, state and local bar associations have pro
bono programs and lawyer referral systems, these programs appear to be
available only for indigent individuals facing personal legal issues.246 Lowresourced targets may face threats to their personal life, but also to their
business. While there are a few resources addressing these problems, better
outreach is needed.247
A few bar associations, like the Massachusetts Bar Association, have
programs like “Dial-a-Lawyer,” which allows any Massachusetts resident to
call and speak to a volunteer attorney about any legal problems or
questions.248 The “Dial-a-Lawyer” service is offered every first Wednesday
of the month for a two-hour period, and is intended to reach those in the
community who could not otherwise access legal advice.249 Additional efforts
like these are needed across the country, and additional publicity needs to be
given to these types of programs so small businesses know that they do have
access free or low-cost legal advice.
Second, outreach to low-resourced entities should also educate this
population about the appropriate behavior of attorneys and disputants.
Enforcement of the rules governing attorney conduct is suboptimal due in
part to ignorance of recipients of abusive cease-and-desist letters. While a
number of local bar associations have attempted to mitigate some of the
unawareness through online reporting systems,250 more can be done to
246. See, e.g., Legal Resource Finder—Find Legal Aid, MASSLEGALSERVICES,
http://www.masslegalservices.org/findlegalaid (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (listing broad categories
covering personal legal issues for which it provides assistance).
247. Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts is one organization that assists artists and cultural
organizations. See, e.g., Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, ARTS & BUS. COUNCIL OF GREATER BOS.,
http://www.artsandbusinesscouncil.org/programs/volunteer-lawyers-for-the-arts.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015). In addition, law school clinics that focus on small business needs are a recently
developed avenue of assistance for low-resourced targets. See, e.g., Intellectual Property &
Entrepreneurship
Clinic,
SUFFOLK UNIV. LAW SCH.,
http://www.suffolk.edu/law
/academics/clinics/21858.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); USC Small Business Clinic, USC GOULD
SCH. OF LAW, http://lawweb.usc.edu/why/academics/clinics/sbc/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
248. Dial-A-Lawyer Offers Free Legal Advice Each Month, MASS. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.massbar.org/for-the-public/need-a-lawyer/dial-a-lawyer (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., FAQS: How Do I File a Complaint Against an Attorney?, MASS. BAR ASS’N,
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educate low-resourced entities and the general public about ethical attorney
behavior and methods of reporting unethical behavior.251

C. More Aggressive Action by the FTC and State Attorneys
General
While the two proposals above attempt to attack the problem of abusive
letters from the sender side by altering the incentives to send an abusive letter,
and from the target side by assisting in overcoming two characteristics
creating a coercive settlement environment, the third characteristic—the
inability to follow through with litigation—is not necessarily mitigated. One
additional proposal to address this characteristic is to enlist the aid of the state
attorneys general offices and the FTC. The state attorneys general and the
FTC have attempted to utilize consumer protection law to stop abusive
cease-and-desist letters from being sent to low-resourced targets.252 However,
currently, such actions have been limited to exceptional situations involving
a large volume of letters and deceptive letter senders.253 Attributing to this
limited applicability may be the fact that the typical abusive cease-and-desist
letter does not neatly fit within the regulations of consumer protection law,
particularly where the letter is not deceptive.254 However, in a statement
before a House of Representatives hearing on a current anti-patent troll bill,
a representative for the FTC stated that the Commission believed it had the
authority to enforce in this area, and the FTC was defending itself in a lawsuit
by MPHJ Technology challenging its authority.255
Another reason for the lack of widespread enforcement efforts may be
the state attorneys general offices and the FTC’s lack of resources. As the
enforcement agency for consumer protection laws, state attorneys general
offices and the FTC enforce a range of different laws, and not just those
pertaining to unfair and deceptive trade practices.256 With budget crunches

http://www.massbar.org/for-the-public/faqs#13749 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); Lawyer Regulation,
CAL. STATE BAR, supra note 165.
251. See, e.g., What Can I Do If I Have a Problem with My Lawyer, CAL. STATE BAR,
http://calbar.ca.gov/Public/Pamphlets/ProblemwithaLawyer.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2015)
(providing additional information educating the public about ethical attorney behavior).
252. See supra Part III.D.
253. See id.
254. See id. Some policymakers believe that this area should be subject to FTC enforcement.
See Baluch, supra note 190, at 1720 (discussing the different methods that members of Congress
presented attempting to allow the FTC to more directly regulate abusive demand letters).
255. See Statement of Lois Greisman, supra note 194.
256. See Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement (last visited
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at state attorneys general offices across the nation, an issue needs to be a top
priority in order to allocate funding, otherwise only the most egregious cases
will likely be investigated.257
Despite resource constraints, the FTC or state attorneys general could
alternatively promulgate rules to combat abusive cease-and-desist letters. For
example, the FTC obtains its authority to promulgate rules regarding unfair
or deceptive trade practices from the Federal Trade Commission Act.258 As
part of this rule-making power, the FTC has promulgated specific rules
relating to abusive practices, such as creditor letters, and requires specific
disclosures to be made to consumers regarding loans.259 A similar
identification of abusive cease-and-desist letters as an unfair business
practice, and perhaps requiring disclosures, could be promulgated through
its rule-making authority. While this would not increase the resources that
the offices have to enforce their rules, and thereby not necessarily assist in
overcoming the inability to follow through with litigation, it could provide a
deterrent effect to potential senders of abusive letters.

V. Criticisms of Policing Cease-and-Desist Letters
Although the proposals in Part IV attempt to police abusive cease-anddesist letters, a number of potential downsides may detract from the urge to
regulate this area of the law. Three main criticisms of such regulation are (1)
the potential for encouraging litigiousness, (2) the potential for increasing the
costs of enforcement for small businesses and individuals, and (3) over-

Mar. 15, 2015).
257. See, e.g., Timothy B. Wheeler, State Trying to Cope with Backlog of Pollution on Violation Cases,
BALT. SUN (Nov. 29, 2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-11-29/features/bs-gr-enforce20111123_1_backlog-violations-enforcement (“And with the state’s budget crunch, MDE has been
unable to get funds for more positions, so the attorney general’s office could not hire more lawyers
to handle the jump in cases . . . .”); Pamela Prah, Texas Saves Big Money Through Effective Child Support
Enforcement, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/09/21/texas-saves-big-money-through-effective-childsupport-enforcement (“On top of the state budget crunch, federal stimulus dollars for child support
have run out. Overall, the attorney general’s office says it will have $110 million less in federal and
state money for child support enforcement over the next two years than in the previous biennium.”);
Christopher Wills, Illinois Attorney General Pushes Back on Budget, ST. J. REG. (Mar. 8, 2012),
http://www.sj-r.com/article/20120308/News/303089888 (“[Illinois Attorney General] is pushing
back against the governor’s call for deeper budget cuts, saying her office’s ability to generate money
for tax payers is already being threatened by low pay and low morale that make it hard to retain
her top lawyers.”).
258. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (2012).
259. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.3 (current through Mar. 12, 2015) (requiring lenders to inform
cosigners about the nature of his or her liability).
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regulating private dispute resolution.

A. Potentially Encouraging Litigiousness
This Article acknowledges that implementing an anti-abusive threats
law could encourage an additional level of litigiousness.260 By providing
targets of abusive cease-and-desist letters with a private cause of action, some
targets may decide to unreasonably or frivolously interpret “abuse.”
Additionally, some targets may unreasonably view any cease-and-desist letter
as abusive.261 While this is a valid concern, it could be overcome by tailoring
the new law in such a way to discourage frivolous abusive threats actions.
One way to do this could be through a two-way fee shifting provision. Thus,
whichever party loses the suit bears the burden of the attorneys’ fees for the
other party. Such could deter the filing of frivolous complaints by adding a
potential cost to the litigation.262 An example of such a mandatory two-way
fee shifting provision is seen in California’s anti-SLAPP law.263
Although there are reported cases where targets of cease-and-desist
letters sue the sender,264 there is currently no outcry over frivolous lawsuits.265
In fact, in some jurisdictions, such as in the United Kingdom, the opposite is
true—legal advisers feel curtailed to send demand letters due to the potential
260. This is a concern of the United Kingdom, which recently undertook a review of their
“groundless threats” law. See generally U.K. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 212:
PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGN RIGHTS: GROUNDLESS THREATS (2013) [hereinafter
U.K. LAW COMM’N: CONSULTATION PAPER].
261. See U.K. LAW COMM’N, PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGN RIGHTS:
GROUNDLESS THREATS 77 (Apr. 2014), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk
/docs/lc346_patents_groundless_threats.pdf [hereinafter U.K. LAW COMM’N: REPORT] (“The
difference between ‘mere notification’ and a threat is in the eye of the receiver . . . .”).
262. But see SUSANNE DI PIETRO, TERESA W. CARNS & PAMELA KELLEY, ALASKA JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, ALASKA’S ENGLISH RULE: ATTORNEY’S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES ES-1213
(Oct. 1995), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfeeexec.pdf (noting that the effect of
fee shifting provisions can be mixed and there is no empirical evidence to prove that it does
discourage frivolous litigation); Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the
Impact of Alaska’s English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 23 (2012).
263. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (West 2015) (“[A] prevailing defendant on a special
motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs. If the court finds
that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court
shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion . . . .”).
264. One recent example from Australia is Bell v. Steele, where the plaintiff (the target of the
cease-and-desist letter) won and was awarded $147,000. Mary Still & Jessica Cowell, One Good Reason
to Take Care Before Threatening Legal Action in Copyright Disputes, CLAYTON UTZ (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.claytonutz.com/publications/edition/29_march_2012/20120329/one_good_reason
_to_take_care_before_threatening_legal_action_in_copyright_disputes.page.
265. It is difficult to prove a negative, and there are no direct statistics on this.
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for a lawsuit, but do not complain about being overly sued.266 This evidence
suggests that introducing an appropriately tailored, abusive threats action
should not cause a drastic increase in litigation.

B. Increasing Enforcement Costs for Small Businesses and
Individuals
Another serious concern with respect to the proposed abusive threats
cause of action is that it could harm small businesses and individuals
attempting to enforce their legal rights. If a small business or individual tries
to enforce their legal rights by sending a cease-and-desist letter without the
aid of an attorney, they could be subject to an abusive threats lawsuit. This
criticism has merit and would force some small businesses and individuals to
forgo enforcement altogether.267 The inability to enforce certain legal rights,
such as intellectual property rights, is an argument that is used by some
patent trolls as a benefit to having non-practicing entities.268 Patent trolls
advocate that with an aggregation of patents and resources, the entity (not
the small business or individual patent owner) can enforce rights that would
otherwise be practically unenforceable.269
However, this Article maintains that the current legal environment is
such that small businesses and individuals already lack the ability to fully
enforce their legal rights without additional assistance.270 An example is the

266. See U.K. LAW COMM’N: REPORT, supra note 261, at 35 (reporting that some legal advisers
may be reluctant to put their name to a letter).
267. Taken to the ultimate extreme, a lack of any enforcement by an intellectual property
rights holder could mean a loss of the intellectual property right. See, e.g., 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:12 (4th ed. 2014) (“Laches is a
good defense if plaintiff’s long failure to exercise its legal rights has caused the defendant to rely to
its detriment by building up a valuable business around its trademark.”). While this is a rare
scenario, it is an argument often used by those who would advocate against reform in this area.
268. See, e.g., Matt Levy, Three Myths About Intellectual Ventures, PATENT PROGRESS (Sept. 17,
2013), http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/09/17/three-myths-intellectual-ventures/ (reporting
that it is a myth that Intellectual Ventures, a patent troll, helps small inventors).
269. See When Patents Attack, NPR (July 22, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money
/2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents-attack (quoting Joe Chernesky, a vice-president at
Intellectual Ventures) (“The neat thing about Chris is he had no idea how to get money for his
patents. He had this great idea. These patents were immensely valuable because every technology
company was adopting the technology. Yet he didn’t know how to get paid. He eventually found
Intellectual Ventures. So we bought those patents.”). But see Mike Masnick, This American Life
Followup on Patents Reveals Intellectual Ventures is Even Slimier Than Previously Believed, TECHDIRT (June 3,
2013), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130603/11295023297/this-american-life-followuppatents-reveals-intellectual-ventures-is-even-slimier-than-previously-believed.shtml.
270. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 65463 (arguing that small businesses and individuals
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case involving Maureen Reddy, an individual inventor with a patent on a
light shade design. In 2012 Reddy pitched her patented product design idea
to Lowe’s Home Improvement.271 Despite her pending patent, Lowe’s
subsequently began selling an extremely similar design.272 Reddy’s
circumstances were such that she would not have been able to enforce her
patent without the free representation provided by Suffolk Law School’s
clinic.273 Therefore, even though there is a chance that adding a cause of
action for abusive threats could raise the cost of enforcement for small
businesses and individuals, overall the practical impact would likely be low.
For enforcement to be more accessible for this population, greater access to
low-cost or free legal assistance is needed, regardless of an additional abusive
threats action.

C. Over-Regulating Private Dispute Resolution
A more theoretical concern with any proposal to police abusive ceaseand-desist letters is that this is merely another unnecessary intrusion into the
private dispute resolution process of private individuals. Contained within
this broader distaste for additional regulation of private disputes is a valid
concern that the proposed abusive threats action could stymie good faith
attempts at negotiating private settlements with alleged infringers.274 Since
one of the overarching goals of this Article’s proposals is to encourage good
faith attempts at discussion and negotiation between rights holders and
targets, this concern is important.
The experiences of other countries are instructive in assessing any
proposed regulations. The United Kingdom Law Commission’s (the “Law
Commission”) study of threats actions discovered that intellectual property
rights holders feel thwarted when inquiring about potential infringements
due to a fear of being sued for groundless threats.275 Although in the United
Kingdom groundless threats law is slightly different than the one proposed,
the recent review by the Law Commission suggests that the groundless
threats law should be reformed to include an explicit safe harbor provision

cannot and should not litigate trademark infringement claims).
271. David v. Goliath: Clinic Takes Early Victory Against Lowe’s, supra note 117.
272. Id.
273. Id. (quoting Eve Brown, the clinic’s director).
274. See U.K. LAW COMM’N: CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 260, at 91109
(documenting various problems that detract from good faith negotiation attempts).
275. See U.K. LAW COMM’N: REPORT, supra note 261, at 77.

GRINVALD_FINALFORPRINT_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE)

Issue 3]

POLICING THE CEASE-AND-DESIST LETTER

8/25/2015 1:06 PM

463

for legitimate communications.276 This safe harbor is intended to allow for
freer communications between an intellectual property rights holder and the
alleged infringer. The elements of the communications protected by the
United Kingdom’s proposed safe harbor are those to (1) track down the
source of infringement; (2) prevent an infringer from raising an innocent
infringer defense; or (3) open negotiations for license terms.277 A similar
explicit safe harbor could be written into the proposed anti-abusive threats
law, with elements focusing on reasonability and whether the sender was
attempting to open the lines of communication between the two parties.278
Although this Article does not advocate any particular elements for such safe
harbor, elements could include a reasonable timeframe given to the target of
the letter, and language to encourage the target to seek the advice of legal
counsel to discuss the letter’s claims.

Conclusion
The increase in sending abusive cease-and-desist letters as a means to
enforce legal rights is a nationwide phenomenon affecting entities and
individuals of all different sizes, and has implications on private dispute
resolution processes. Although this is problematic overall, it is particularly
disturbing when the targets of abusive letters are small businesses and
individuals due to the coercive negotiation environment created. When lowresourced individuals or businesses enter into a settlement agreement with
abusive letter senders, they are likely coerced due to their inability to
information-gather, susceptibility to inducement, and an inability to finance
the litigation. Therefore, such agreements should be declared void. However,
due to the inability of this population to litigate, these coerced agreements
would likely never be invalidated, and a situation of de facto enforceability of
coerced agreements ensues. This Article proposes a number of different
solutions to reduce the factors that create the coercive environment in the
hopes of encouraging a good faith and more equalized settlement processes.
While there are limitations and downsides to these proposals, particularly
with respect to this Article’s proposed anti-abusive threats law, these solutions
should be considered as part of an overall conversation regarding reform in
the area of the abusive over-enforcement of legal rights.

276. Id. at 78.
277. Id.
278. Safe harbors, when designed appropriately, can be effective vehicles for cutting down on
unwanted litigation. See Eric Goldman, Designing Optimal Immunities and Safe Harbors, TECH. & MKTG.
LAW
BLOG
(Apr.
15,
2013),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04
/designing_optim_1.htm.

